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Abstract 
 
 
This study has analysed the experience and legitimacy of South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
in resolving African conflicts, using comparative study of Burundi and Lesotho. The 
main findings of the study are as follows: 
First, since 1994 South Africa’s foreign policy has evolved and directed at ensuring peace 
and stability in African continent. During Mandela era, the policy was dominated by 
human rights. When Mbeki took over in 1999 the policy was reconfigured and moved 
towards peace and economic prosperity in African continent to achieve African 
Renaissance. Second it has been argued that the interventions in Lesotho and Burundi 
were legitimate and successful despite the controversies in particular Lesotho. Last, the 
experience and lessons learnt in Lesotho helped to shape South Africa’s foreign policy 
when mediating in Burundi conflict which had led to a notable success.  
CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
In 1994, history was made in South Africa, following its smooth and peaceful transfer of 
power and transition from an apartheid regime to a democratically elected government.  
Nelson Rholihlahla Mandela was sworn in as a president of the Republic of South Africa. 
This became a model not only for Africa, but also for other parts of the world. South 
Africa was accepted back into the international fold. From 1994 till the present, South 
Africa has emerged as a major power on the African continent and an influential actor in 
global affairs. The country’s foreign policy has undergone a clear shift directed by its 
quest for peace, stability, growth and the renaissance of Africa. However, to be a regional 
power imposes a great challenge and responsibility. “The country is expected to play not 
only a leading role in conflict intervention and prevention, but also in the development of 
the continent. Its diplomatic and economic policies in Africa and engagement with 
Western countries and multi-laterals on the resolution of conflict especially in the African 
Great Lakes (in particular Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, and Rwanda) 
and West Africa are geared towards realising this vision.” 1  
 
However, there have been ambiguities, which frequently surround the intervention of 
states into affairs of others. Ayebare (2001:34) states that the earliest definition of 
intervention explains it as a high and summary procedure, which may sometimes snatch a 
remedy beyond the reach of law. Nevertheless, Ayebare argues that as in the case of a 
revolution, its essence is illegality and its justification is its success. Intervention in 
Africa has been a challenge due to the strong belief in state sovereignty. During the 1970s 
and 1980s many African rulers refused to entertain criticism of their human rights record, 
                                                          
1 Radebe T, Intervention in African Conflicts: Dilemmas Facing South Africa, presented at South African 
Association of Political Science Biennial Conference, 21-23 September 2004, University of Transkei. 
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which unfortunately persist to this day. The outside assistance or monitoring of their 
performance was disallowed on the grounds that this was a violation of their state 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The most recent example of this argument is Sudan’s 
efforts and relative success in keeping the international community from becoming 
involved in the alleged genocide in Darfur.  A less prominent example is that of 
Equatorial Guinea, where three successive elections ensure that the power remains 
securely in the Onguema hands.2
 
 However, the absolute sovereignty of the state has been increasingly questioned on two 
grounds. First, who is authorised to act on behalf of the people whose sovereign interests 
are not represented by their government. Second, who should intervene on behalf of a 
minority facing extreme repression by a government claiming to represent the will of the 
majority? The UN has been regarded as the obvious repository of abusing state 
sovereignty, but in practice, it has not been prepared to assume the responsibility, as the 
case of Rwanda in 1994 proved. In August 2002, a review of the United Nations Peace 
Operations (the Brahimi Report) was released. The report recommended that 
peacekeeping operation responsibilities should be deferred to coalitions of states and 
regional bodies, mainly because of a lack of financial resources resulting from the late or 
non-payment of membership dues, owed to both the UN’s peacekeeping and regular 
budgets.  The report asserted that financial problems were the major stumbling block that 
impaired the organisation’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities in relation to 
peacekeeping. 3  
  
President Thabo Mbeki expressed his opinion on the UN approach, based on this report 
that seemed to avoid the sort of engagement required of the Security Council with respect 
to maintaining international peace and security. Given South Africa’s influence in Africa, 
the country now has to determine whether political and military intervention is a suitable 
option in Africa’s conflict-riddled areas, which include low intensity conflicts, instability 
                                                          
2 UN Secretary General Report. The Causes of conflict and the Promotion of a Durable and Sustainable 
Development in Africa. www.un.org. 16 April, 1998.  
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and genocide. 4  Some of South Africa’s interventions have been criticised because of the 
controversy that they evoke about the new interpretation of sovereignty in contrast to the 
commonly accepted interpretation as embedded in International Law. South African 
foreign policy in the region has been geared towards changing Africa for the better, 
through institutions such as the African Union (AU) and its organs, notably the Peace and 
Security Council, the Pan African Parliament (PAP) and New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development. On the other hand it has been argued that South African foreign policy 
formation is based on narrow economic interests. 5
 
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
This study has set out to analyse the experience and legitimacy of South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy in resolving African conflicts, using comparative study of Burundi and Lesotho. 
As part of explaining South Africa’s foreign policy, a critical analysis of the legalities 
regarding South Africa’s intervention and mediation in these two countries has been 
discussed extensively.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
This study will be guided by the following three research questions: 
 
♦ What are the key principles of South African foreign policy since 1994 with regard to 
conflict resolution in Africa? 
♦ What are the legalities regarding South Africa’s intervention and mediation in 
African Conflicts? 
♦ What lessons learnt by South Africa, through its engagement in African conflicts in 
particular Lesotho and Burundi, contributed to shaping its foreign policy? 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 Briefing Regional Security Organisations and the challenge of Regional Peacekeeping. http://www.una-
uk.org/UN&C/regionalsecurity.html.   
4 Africa Recovery. Brahimi panel proposals for peacekeeping reform. A United Nations Publication, 
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll4no3/securbs.htm  
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1.4 Analytical Framework 
 
Although a legal perspective of intervention has been strongly justified by the theory of 
realism because of its notion of power and national interest, this study argues that South 
Africa’s foreign policy with regard to intervention in African conflicts is influenced by 
idealism with a touch of realpolitik. Realists believe that the main goal of states is power, 
supported by national interest. The realists concern with the state comes from concern 
with security issues of power. The realists believe that the international system is an 
anarchic self-help system in which states struggle for power. The founding fathers of this 
theory are Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. In particular, Hobbes’ view of the state 
of nature in which he argues that life is nasty, brutish and short is extended to the 
international context. 6 According to this theory, states are the dominant actors in the 
international system. Military power is also strongly emphasised. 7  
 
Looking at South Africa’s consistent endeavours to export its model of conflict resolution 
elsewhere on the continent, one can argue that South Africa’s foreign policy is not only 
influenced by national interests. The evidence for idealist dominance in South African 
foreign policy lies in the attention to painstaking consensus building and compromise in 
an attempt to resolve conflict between the warring parties and to encourage democratic 
reforms in countries like Burundi, DRC and Côte d’Ivoire.  The South African 
government has been encouraging the use of regional and international organisations 
such as South African Development Community (SADC), African Union (AU) and 
United Nations (UN). Intervention on the African continent by the South African 
government is strongly characterised by diplomacy and negotiations through promoting 
democracy and human rights. 8 Snayder Jack (2004) also argues that idealism illuminates 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Ibid… 
 
6 See Hans Mogenthau, 1978  Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, 
Revised. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. P.4-15 and Carr E, H (1981) The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. 
London, Papermac.  
 
7 From this point of view, realists define national interest mainly in terms of whatever enhances or 
preserves states security, its influence, and its military and economic power. See Rourke, J.T. 2005 
International Relations on the World Stage. Boston: McGraw-Hill. p.19 
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the changing norms of sovereignty, human rights and international justice as well as the 
increased potency of religious ideas in politics. He further states that persuasive ideas, 
collective values, culture and social identities shape international politics. President 
Thabo Mbeki often raises these issues, especially with regard to his vision of the African 
Renaissance. 
 
Theodore and Wolfe (1990) argue that the great variety of proponents of the idealist 
school includes pacifists, world federalists, humanitarians, legalists and moralists.9 The 
principles of idealism include the respect for rules rather than rulers, peaceful and 
arbitrated change, progressive taxation that allows for gradual redistribution of income 
and property, fragmented and accountable governmental structures and above all civil 
rights that guarantee the freedoms of speech, worship, organisation and peaceful 
petitioning of government. 
 
Brown (1997) states that Liberal Internationalists/idealists believe that the people have a 
real interest in desire for peace and that democratic regimes, would if given a chance, 
allow these interests to dominate. The basic premise of liberal internationalism was that 
the force of world opinion would buttress the League of Nations and that no state would 
be able to act against this force. The point of collective security under the league was to 
prevent wars and not to fight them.10 Baylis J. and Smith S. (2001) state that idealism’s 
idea of the collective security system is a central to organisations such as the League of 
Nations and the United Nations. Collective security refers to an arrangement where each 
state in the system accepts that security of one is the concern of all and agrees to join in a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 ‘Core philosophical tenets of South African foreign policy, such as a commitment to multilateralism, 
human rights and global governance reform, but also represents the clearest case of idealism informing 
policy formulation.’ Composers and players: Harmony and discord in South African foreign policy making 
by Tim Hughes, September 2004,p.78 
9 This school is identified with great names such as Henri de Saint-Simon, Mahatma Gandhi, Woodrow 
Wilson, John Locke and Bertrand Russell. Couloumbus A.T. and Wolfe J.H., 1990 Introduction to 
International relations: Power and Justice. P.8-10  
 
10 Liberal internationalism is renamed Utopianism, later writers sometimes use Idealism, Brown, C. 1997, 
Understanding International Relations.p.26-30.   
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collective response of aggression.11According to Kegley, Jr. C.W. and Wittkopf E.R. 
(1995) idealists embraced the world collectively on the following beliefs: 
♦ Human nature is essentially altruistic: people are therefore capable of mutual aid and 
collaboration. 
♦ The fundamental human concern for the welfare of others makes progress possible. 
♦ Bad human behaviour is essentially the product not of people as individuals, but of 
evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and 
to harm others including war. 
♦ War is not inevitable and eradicating the institutional arrangements that encourage it 
can reduce its frequency. 
♦ War is an international problem that requires collective or multilateral rather than 
national to control it. 
♦ International society must reorganise itself to eliminate the institutions that makes 
war likely. 
  
The other group of idealist prescriptions emphasises the legal control of war. They call 
for the use of legal processes such as mediation and arbitration to settle disputes and 
inhibit recourse to war. Lastly, international organisations adherence to the law, 
disarmament and democracy could make the world a safer place.12 However, the touch of 
realpolitik mentioned earlier is evident in South Africa’s political and military dominance 
in Africa. The South African government has deployed a number of military 
peacekeepers in Africa to restore peace and prevent any other possibilities of war. Marais 
(1997) argues that South Africa has replenished its military arsenals with a R45.2 billion 
procument of fighter planes, helicopters and navy vessels for this purpose. The former 
Deputy Defence Minister Ronnie Kasrils is alleged to have stated, “We will now be able 
to talk softly and walk with a big stick.”13  
                                                          
 
11 Many principles of idealism are contained in Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, in particular the need 
for an International Organisation to maintain peace and security. Baylis J. and Smith S. 2001  The 
Globalization of World Politics (second edition) An introduction to international relations.  
12 See Kegley, Jr C.W. and Wittkopf E.R. 1995, World Politics    Trend and Transformation. 
 
13 Marais, H. Diplomacy Discarded for Intervention: South Africa Carries a Big Stick. Le Monde 
Diplomatique. March 1999, p.3. 
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1.5 Methodology 
 
The study is qualitative and different methods of data collection have been used. These 
include both primary and secondary data. With regard to primary data, interviews have 
been conducted with different stakeholders such as government officials and researchers 
from South Africa, Lesotho and Burundi. The secondary data has been sourced from 
various academic publications from Wartenweiler Library, Cullen Africa Library, Jan 
Smuts House Library and other public, national and university libraries. Different 
journals published by recognised non-governmental organisations such as the South 
African Institute of International Affairs, Institute for Global Dialogue, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung and Institute for Security Studies have also been utilised. In addition, articles 
written by prominent intellectuals and academics that have appeared in both the print and 
electronic media (including magazines and newspapers) have been used. The Internet is 
also an important secondary search tool that was utilised during the research process. 
However, there have been limitations when the study was conducted. This research report 
mainly does comparative case studies of Burundi and Lesotho. One would have wanted 
to use references to other countries where South Africa has been involved such as 
Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, but because of 
the time constraints, it was not possible to make the case studies of all these countries. 
Again one wished to have spent some time in particular in Burundi to interact with the 
people and to assess the situation, but due to financial constraints one had to rely mostly 
on secondary sources and interviews from different people inside South Africa. The 
reason being that a lot has been happening recently in Burundi and it would be great to 
get the first hand information.  
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1.6 Chapter Outline   
 
This research report comprises of six chapters.  Chapter one is an introductory chapter, 
which gives a brief background to the study and what, and how it sets to achieve the 
stated aims and objectives. The research questions that guide the study are clearly 
defined. The analytical frame and the methodology used in the study have been discussed 
extensively in this chapter.  
 
Chapter two gives a brief overview of South Africa’s foreign policy with particular 
reference to conflict mediation and interventions in Africa.  It explains how foreign 
policy has evolved since 1994 from its Eurocentric view to focus on the issues that are of 
interest/concern to the African continent. This chapter also discusses the major principles 
of South Africa’s foreign policy, which include promotion of human rights, economic 
development and conflict resolution and peace in Africa. The continuity and 
reconfiguration of the foreign policy during Mandela and Mbeki years has been discussed 
extensively. It has been argued that during Mandela years the policy was dominated by 
human rights. During Mbeki the policy directed towards peace and economic prosperity 
on the continent and achieving African Renaissance.  
 
Chapter three analyses the legalities regarding interventions in war-torn African 
countries. It also discusses the debates that surround the issue of sovereignty and third 
party intervention in the internal affairs of the country. The reference to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights located in the UN Charter and the African Union 
Constitutive Act have been cited to legal basis of third party interventions. These include 
the gross violation of human rights, unconstitutional change of government and clear 
cases of failed states where the central authority is non-functioning and civilian 
population is at the mercy of militias and warlords.  
 
In chapter four, the nature of the crises in Lesotho and South Africa’s military 
intervention in 1998 is discussed extensively. South Africa’s diplomatic efforts and 
military intervention have also been discussed extensively in this chapter. As this 
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operation was conducted in the full glare of media, the reaction of the media in criticising 
the intervention and South Africa’s response is also discussed. Finally, the legal basis 
towards Lesotho intervention, South Africa’s foreign policy towards Lesotho crisis and 
lessons learnt has been critically analysed.  
 
Chapter five discusses the background to the conflict in Burundi and South Africa’s role 
in mediating, comparing with the crisis in Lesotho. This chapter also discusses Mandela’s 
efforts in bringing together the warring parties that resulted in the signing of Arusha 
agreement in 2000, which culminated the installation of transitional government. Former 
Deputy President Jacob Zuma’s role in bringing other parties who were not part of the 
agreement has been discussed. South Africa’s role in post conflict building initiatives 
such as Disarmament, Dimobilisation and reintegration that led to peaceful and 
successful elections that saw former Hutu rebel group leader Pierre Nkurunzinza sworn in 
as a democratically elected president on 26 August 2005. 
 
 Chapter six concludes by paraphrasing the whole thesis and highlighting the most 
important aspects of the research. Findings of the study are also discussed and 
recommendations are made regarding South Africa’s foreign policy and legal principles 
of non-intervention and sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2. Overview of South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines South Africa’s foreign policy prior to 1994 and relations with the 
international community. The major principles that guide South African foreign policy 
are stipulated and key points are discussed. South Africa’s foreign policy during 
President Mandela’s term of office (1994─1999) is examined and the role that South 
Africa played outside the country is discussed extensively. The changing nature of South 
Africa’s foreign policy during Thabo Mbeki’s (1999─2005) era and its vision for the 
African continent is also discussed. The highlights and lowlights of South Africa’s 
foreign policy over the last decade are also discussed extensively. 
 
 
2.2 Background to South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
 
The development of South Africa’s foreign policy can be traced back from 1948 when 
apartheid regime led by National Party (NP) was installed. This mean that Pretoria’s 
Foreign Policy can be divided into two phases. The first phase spans the years of National 
Party rule (1948-1994), and second, the phase of African National Congress (ANC) led 
government. This phase includes the transition period of 1990-1994 as it formed the 
foundation of post-1994.14   
 
                                                          
14 However, there is no official document that exists on South Africa’s foreign policy. The declared policy 
can be determined by analysing the speeches and actions of relevant politicians and officials. The most 
important sources of information in this regard are speeches of former president, Nelson Mandela, 
President Thabo Mbeki, former foreign minister, Alfred Nzo, current foreign minister Nkosazana Zuma 
and Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Other sources include research papers on foreign policy as well as 
the policy documents of political parties and foreign discussion of foreign affairs. See Henwood, R. 1997 
South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems. Monograph 13, Pretoria. Pp. 1-13. 
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After South Africa transformed into a democratic government, the outside world looked 
increasingly towards it to play a constructive role in the demarginalisation of the African 
continent. South Africa has been focussing on Africa’s regional organisations such as the 
African Union (AU) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) to ensure 
that the principles which guide its foreign policy are applied for the betterment of all the 
peoples of Africa. In a number of ways the country’s foreign policy serves as a 
framework upon which all African foreign relations are conducted. It determines the 
manner in which a country will interact with other countries. South Africa is inextricably 
part of Africa, it is so fundamental that the country’s foreign policy reflects and promotes 
its national interests which geared towards achieving peace and economic development 
of the continent. It is much easier for anyone to understand South Africa’s foreign policy 
if one examines the historical background of the policy prior 1994. 15
 
Habib and Selinyane (2004) argue that there are two distinct perspectives emerging in the 
debates about South Africa’s role on the continent. It is seen either as an emerging power 
and a pivotal state or a selfish hegemon. In the first position South Africa is seen as a 
middle power. The term middle power is used to denote, first, a position in a universal 
hierarchical order of states, second, size and rank in the international division of labour, 
which confers the opportunity to exert moral influence on the global system and third, an 
interest in a stable international order that does not seek to impose an ideological 
preconceived vision of an ideal world order. A middle power operates through 
multilateral avenues, since it cannot impose its vision on a global scale. South Africa has 
been exemplary in its control of small arms, voluntary denuclearisation and the ban of 
anti-personnel land mines; and it played a leading part in the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty Review and Extension Conference of 1995 and the prescription of trade in 
diamonds to finance regional wars. It also stood out as a leading voice lobbying for the 
Third World at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The term pivotal gives a character 
of importance to South Africa’s foreign policy that implicitly stresses partnership, 
multilateralism and non-assertive behaviour.16    
                                                          
15 See, Landsberg, C. 2004 Southern African governance ten years after apartheid. In Landsberg, C. and 
Mackay, S. Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The search for Democratic Governance. 
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Dube  (2003) argues that before 1994, South Africa managed to create more enemies than 
friends in the international community because of the hostilities of the apartheid regime. 
Security concerns have dominated the agenda of South African policy objectives given 
the tense atmosphere that existed between Pretoria and its neighbours. The government 
spent most time exploring military options to protect the country from antagonistic states 
that resented the fact that they had to depend on South Africa for a number of essential 
services. South Africa used its military strength to pursue its foreign policy objectives, 
which aimed at among other things, creating instability in the region and preserving white 
minority rule. The majority of South Africans were subjected to discrimination and 
oppression, while other countries fell victim to destabilisation policies, which left many 
people dead and others internally and externally displaced. “The estimated damage 
caused by the apartheid regime in neighbouring countries amount to $65 billion. The 
destabilisatioin policies of the apartheid regime contributed to an atmosphere of 
insecurity in Southern Africa. The formation of the Front Line States (FLS) was a 
desperate attempt to break the bridge that connects South Africa with countries in the 
Southern African region. However, victory was only achieved with the demise of the 
apartheid regime in 1994.”17  
 
“However, there has been confusion in the post-apartheid South Africa as to the nature of 
foreign policy and the kinds of roles the state should adopt in the region and in the wider 
world is in no small part attributable to the pull/push effects of this competing triad of 
theoretical perspectives and the lack of consensus within the ranks of the ruling party that 
has been generated by the consequent tensions. This has been caused by the foreign 
policy which is often argued out within a context of competing and often mutually 
exclusive perspectives-for example, pragmatic demands that ties with Europe and North 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. 2004 South Africa’s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of an African 
Century. In: Sidiropoulos, E. ed. Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 1994-
2004.Johannesburg: SAIIA.pp.49-60. 
 
17 See Dube K.M. 2003 AISA Electronic Monograph. Overview of South Africa’s Foreign Policy in Africa. 
Johannesburg: AISA. Pp. 1-6.  
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America ought to be paramount, set against socialist and idealist demands that policy 
ought to be ethical, solidarist and Afro-centric.”18  
 
 
2.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy since 1994 
 
“Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign policy”.  
Former President Nelson Mandela. 
 
As early as 1993, ANC President Nelson Mandela articulated several principles, which 
would underpin South Africa’s future foreign policy. These principles were further 
elaborated in March 1994, when the ANC published a comprehensive foreign policy 
document entitled, ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa’. This 
document advanced seven principles, which ought to guide the South Africa’s new 
foreign policy: 
 
♦ A belief in and preoccupation with human rights which extends beyond the political, 
embracing economic, social and environmental dimensions; 
♦ A belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of human kind can only come 
through the promotion of democracy world wide; 
♦ A belief that justice and international law should guide relations between nations; 
♦ A belief that international peace is the goal towards which all nations should strive; 
♦ A belief that South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect the interest of Africa; 
♦ A belief that South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional and 
international economic operation; and  
♦ A belief that South Africa’s foreign relations must mirror a deep commitment to the 
consolidation of its democracy.19 
                                                          
 
18 See, Graham, E. 1999 Foreign Policy. Spence, J.E. In: After Mandela The 1999 South African Elections. 
Great Britain: Royal Institute of International Affairs.pp. 66─73. 
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These principles guide and shape the manner in which the Department of Foreign Affairs 
conducts official relations within both bilateral and multilateral context. The department 
seeks to actively serve and promote the interests of South Africa by engaging with the 
world through foreign representatives in South Africa’s accredited representatives 
abroad, as well as through foreign representatives in South Africa. In order to achieve its 
principles, South Africa has about 95 missions abroad and has non-resident 
representation in 50 countries. Currently, it is a member of more than 20 international 
organisations and has relations with 165 countries. A hundred and one of these countries 
have resident missions in South Africa, while forty are represented non-residentially. 
20Three main principles of South Africa’s foreign policy are discussed below to establish 
their importance. These are promotion of human rights, economic development and 
conflict resolution and peace in Africa. 
 
 
2.3.1 Promotion of Human Rights 
 
 During the African National Congress (ANC) struggle for liberation in South Africa was 
in many ways a struggle for fundamental human rights. Therefore, it is no coincidence 
that human rights are canonised as the cornerstone in its foreign policy. In addition, the 
emphasis on the promotion of democracy and adherence to international law embodies 
the values and norms enshrined in South Africa’s new constitution. 
 
Suttner (1997) argues that the promotion of human rights and democracy in foreign 
policy is easy to state as an aspiration. It is, however, difficult to implement and there are 
no easy answers as to how it should be done. He further states that the question of human 
rights is a key aspect of foreign policy projection found in the ANC Foreign Policy 
document of 1993, which speaks of the need for efforts to incorporate human rights in 
our international relations and the necessity for a worldwide human rights campaign. The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 See Le Pere, G. and Van Niewkerk, A.  2002 ‘ Facing the New Millennium: South Africa’s Foreign 
Policy in a Globalising World. In: K.G Adar and R. Ajulu (2002) Globalisation and Emerging Trends in 
African States Foreign Policy-Making Process. England: Ashgate 
20 See, the South African Consulate General, 2005 Foreign Relations. New York: SACG. Pp. 2-6.   
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commitment has also found expression in various statements by former president Nelson 
Mandela, President Thabo Mbeki, Ministers and Officials of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs.21
 
Dube (2003) argues that respect for human rights is the cornerstone of South Africa’s 
foreign policy and is enshrined in the constitution of the country.  Since South Africa 
itself has been the scene of the gravest abuses of human rights and democracy 
internationally, for the ANC, the struggle is for fundamental human rights. It is no 
wonder that South Africa’s foreign policy places so much emphasis on respect for human 
rights. Based on this, South Africa is expected not to maintain trade and diplomatic 
relations with states that violate fundamental human rights. But this has been a centre of 
criticism in light of the promotion of human rights. South Africa was quick to restore 
relations with Libya, which is not regarded as a democratic country.  It is precisely 
because Libya played a vital role in helping the ANC during the struggle against 
apartheid. 22   
 
The other criticism has been the issue of Zimbabwe. South Africa endorsed the outcome 
of Zimbabwe’s presidential and parliamentary elections although Zimbabwe African 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) supporters allegedly violated human rights. The so-
called policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ that has been used by the Pretoria government in 
dealing with the Zimbabwe crises has been strongly criticised. 23It is also argued that the 
support of ZANU-PF by the ANC led government has been influenced by the support it 
gave to South Africa during the apartheid regime. In that sense, South Africa seems to be 
confronted with the dilemma of pursuing foreign policy goals, in particular, the 
promotion of human rights and democracy, which clash with the practices of some 
African states. If that is the case, there are serious concerns when the government cannot 
draw a line between the party and the state, which ultimately undermines democracy. 
However, one can never underestimate the role that South Africa has played in trying to 
                                                          
 
21 Suttner, R. 1997 South African Foreign Policy and the Promotion of Human Rights. In: South African 
Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
22 Dube, K. 2003. Op cit. p.4 
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stop the violation of human rights in conflict-ridden countries such as Burundi, Rwanda 
and others.  
 
Mills (1998/99) also argues that South Africa has outwardly displayed concerns over 
human rights and democratisation elsewhere, such as over the East Temorese issue in its 
relations with Indonesia, in President Mandela’s strong outburst against the government 
of General Sani Abacha at the 1995 Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) in 
Auckland, in its attempt to mediate solution to problems in Africa and even the 
delegation sent to assist in the Northern Ireland peace process. 24  
 
Schoeman, M. (2002) further assets that South Africa’s policy during the early years was 
not so much the result of an excessive idealism and altruism, but failure to make clear the 
importance to its direct national interest of government’s broader goals. This meant that 
the country did not develop a strategy to link its goals of security and wealth creation to 
the broader imperative of changing conditions to help fulfill these objectives. South 
Africa’s commitment to support human rights internationally, peaceful conflict 
resolution, the promotion of democratic values and to the restructuring of global political 
economy (ranging from the structure of the United Nations (UN) Security Council to an 
improvement in Africa’s position in the world’s economic order) attests to its dual 
commitment. A changed international environment more conducive to meeting the needs 
of the South, and Africa as a whole will have a positive effect on domestic conditions. 25  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Ibid… 
 
24 Mills, G. 1998/99 South African Foreign Policy in Review. In: South African Yearbook of International 
Affairs. P.6.   
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2.3.2 Economic Development 
 
 The post-apartheid Government of National Unity (GNU) launched the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (RDP) which aimed at sustainable reconstruction and 
Development in South Africa and in Southern African region. This focussed on social 
and economic development of the country. The programme includes supplying 
electricity, water, telephones, sanitation and building houses in disadvantaged areas. 
Initially, South Africa’s foreign policy was influenced and reflected by the objectives of 
the RDP. It was anticipated that in the long term, the programme would benefit the whole 
region. However, South Africa abandoned the RDP two years later after criticism by 
international institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). It 
was replaced by a more ambitious macro-economic strategy the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR). The introduction of GEAR marked a change in the economic 
approach of South Africa towards the rest of the continent. A number of South African 
companies are doing business all over Africa. The major concerns are the trade disparities 
where South Africa benefits the most from intra-continental trade whereas there are few 
imports from those African countries.  
 
 South Africa’s foreign economic policy was characterised by a major attempt to open the 
country’s markets to international competition, reduce the budget deficit, get inflation 
under control and make the country attractive for foreign investment. It also took on a 
special relationship with the USA, institutionalised in the Bi-national Commission, 
overseen by two deputy presidents, Mbeki and Gore. South African foreign policy 
behaviour during the Mandela and Mbeki eras fits the expectations of a deductive model 
very well. This literally means that the country starts from general to particular when 
trying to achieve its foreign policy. This is justified by the commitment to multilateralism 
that is qualified by the policy elite’s concept of the country’s position within globalising 
economy. The GNU has perceived glabalisation as presenting options for attracting 
foreign investment if only the main suppliers of such investment can be attracted in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
25 Schoeman, M. 2001/02 Objectives, Structures and Strategies: South Africa’s Foreign Policy. In: 
SAYearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
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sufficient numbers. The most important steps for its gamble on investment were to 
provide itself to be a good citizen and to be seen to endorse the hegemonic values of the 
current world order. Mandela era motivated the GNU policy elite to explain opportunities 
provided by multilateral institutions to push out the perceived limits and commitment to 
reformist projects in international system.26 However, this is not the focus of this study, 
as this research is looking at South Africa’s foreign policy with regard to preventing and 
resolving conflicts in Africa.27
 
 
2.3.3 Conflict Resolution and Promoting Peace in Africa:  
 
“It is a great irony that at a time when most nations are enjoying 
what the French called tranquillite d’esprit with each other, as a 
result of the end of the Cold War or what Francis Fukuyama and 
Daniel Bell have respectively called the end of history ideology, 
some nations in Africa are at war with each other, or more 
specifically with their own people. At least half of the sub-Saharan 
African countries have experienced violent (mainly civil) conflict 
over the last five years. This seems to suggest that regional leaders 
show more respect for each other than they do for their own 
people.”28
 
Mda (2003/04) argues that in 1994 South Africa entered the discourse on regional 
conflict with the main aim of assisting the achievement of peace in Africa. Looking at its 
own experience of resolving internal disputes (which led to the first multiparty elections 
in 1994), South Africa has been emphasising dialogue and mediation as the main means 
of resolving conflict. The official mediation being an exercise in conflict resolution 
facilitated by a neutral third party has been a prominent feature of South Africa’s new 
security policy. It has also emphasised the empowerment of institutions and organisations 
outside the purview of government. These independent bodies have served not only as 
                                                          
26 See Nel, P. 2002, Untangling the ‘Gamble on Investment’ Elite Perceptions of Globalisation and South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy during Mandela Era. In: Globalisation and Emerging Trends in African States’ 
Foreign Policy- Making Process. A Comparative perspective of Southern Africa.   
27 Ibid.p.3-6 
 
28 Dlamini K. 2001/04 Assessing South Africa’s Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution. In: South African 
Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. P.6.  
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watchdogs and advisers to state personnel involved in conflict resolution arrangements, 
they also provided their services to the parties in opposition in a bid to facilitate a peace 
building process. A significant part of South Africa’s success model lies in co-operation 
between the state and non-governmental organisations. 
 
Mda (2003/04) further argues that presently, South Africa can boast a short though 
controversial history in conflict resolution. Perhaps the most notable of this country’s 
experience in this field manifested itself in the events leading up to the DRC conflict in 
1996, when the then Zaire was being overrun by rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila. 
South Africa sought to play an expanded role in African conflicts when the then President 
Mandela attempted to broker a peace deal between the president at the time, Mobutu Sese 
Seko and Kabila. South Africa continued to mediate even after Laurent Kabila’s death. 
The DRC has now managed to institute a transitional government and accomplished the 
momentous adoption of a constitution for the first time due to South Africa’s role. 
 
Gwexe (2000) argues that African conflict resolution gained prominence after the 
Rwanda genocide as it dawned on African leaders that external intervention in conflict 
situations could no longer be relied upon as an alternative means of managing conflicts.29
 
However, Pretoria’s motives were suspicious in the eyes of international community in 
1998, when it undertook a military intervention in Lesotho, which cost South Africa 
dearly. This is further discussed in Chapter Four of the thesis. However, in 1999, South 
Africa regained respect for its role in pushing for a diplomatic solution to the conflicts in 
Africa notable the DRC, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire. Nonetheless, South Africa’s efforts 
at regional peace-making and conflict resolution have not proceeded without hindrance. 
While the international community aid so-called progressive countries in the region have 
welcomed South Africa’s efforts, others have viewed these mediations with great 
suspicion.30
                                                          
29 See Gwexe SG, Prospects for African Conflict Resolution in the next millennium. South Africa’s View: 
African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 1,1,2000. 
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Solomon (2002) argues that Pretoria views the plethora of wars currently waged on the 
African continent as anathema to the notion of an African Renaissance. Recognising that 
there can be no emancipation for Africa’s people from socio-economic misery if conflicts 
persist, the South African government has made the ending of these conflicts one of its 
main foreign policy goals. In 1994, the South African Ambassador to the United Nations 
noted:  
‘South Africa believes that in the Southern African context as also 
further afield, the fundamental objective of our regional policy should 
be preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and humanitarian assistance’ 
Solomon (2002: 43). 
 
Six years later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, stressed 
the importance of preventative diplomacy, when she said, ‘The regional conflicts 
wreaking havoc across the continent cast a dark shadow over the prospects of success of 
the vision of the African Renaissance. It is wrong to think that all conflicts should be 
resolved through the barrel of the gun. Political solutions should be explored at all 
times.’31
 
Solomon further argues that preventative diplomacy, which may be defined as action to 
prevent disputes from arising between warring parties to prevent existing disparities from 
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur, lies at the 
very heart of South Africa’s regional policy. Solomon argues that South Africa has failed 
to deal with other African conflicts due to a number of reasons. First, the most salient 
failure to understand the root causes of conflict. The issue related to this problem of 
perception and misinterpretation, a lack of conflict prevention capacity inside the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and bureaucratic infighting, resulting in incompetence. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 For more information see Mda, N. 2003/04 South Africa’s role in Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa: 
Prospects for Co-operation with the US. In: South African Yearbook of International Affairs. 
Johannesburg: SAIIA.    
31 Solomon, H. 2002 South African Foreign Policy. ‘Preventive Diplomacy and false Promise’, In: Journal 
of International Affairs, Volume 9, Number 2, Johannesburg: SAIIA.    
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Others argue that quiet diplomacy without teeth is bound to fail and that Pretoria needs to 
show more stick and less carrot in its negotiations with the Mugabe’s of the world.32
 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that South Africa’s failures in some preventative 
diplomacy are mirrored in the failure of other peace initiatives. The non-implementation 
of the Oslo Peace Accords for the Middle East, the disintegration of the Day for the 
Peace Accords for former Yugoslavia and the problems currently surrounding the Good 
Friday Accords in Northern Ireland all seem to point a deeper problem relating to the idea 
of conflict resolution itself. Only a quarter of modern civil wars have found their way to 
negotiations and two-thirds of internal conflicts have ended in the surrender or the 
elimination of one of the parties involved.  
 
 
2.4 Foreign Policy during the Mandela years (1994─1999) 
 
South Africa’s return as a full member of the international community commenced with 
Mandela’s inauguration as the country’s first democratically elected President. The 
political reform process set in motion from 1990 to 1994 had led to improved relations 
between South Africa and the rest of the world. No more a pariah state, after May 1994, 
South African leadership under Mandela began seeking a new global image for the 
country. This needed radical changes of direction in foreign policy, to incorporate the 
views of Mandela and the ANC before the liberation of the country. Despite all too 
evident legacies of the apartheid era, Mandela and his team began involving new South 
Africa in the wider world, just as the wider world went out of the way to involve itself in 
South Africa.33
    
                                                          
32 Ibid… 
 
33 ‘South African foreign policy has attempted to steer a neutral path, as one would expect from a 
Government of National Unity (GNU), A government which inherited a whole range of ideological 
convictions and past baggage. The principle governing its foreign policy has labelled as 
universality─essentially the opening of foreign and local doors in reconciliatory spirit that has characterised 
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South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 has undergone some shifts during Presidents 
Mandela and Mbeki’s term of office. During Mandela, the foreign policy focused on 
being re-admitted by the international community. He had to go around the world to 
regain the international acceptance and isolation that South Africa experienced during the 
Apartheid era. As a result, South Africa has been readmitted to full membership of the 
UN, to the Commonwealth, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
Organisation of African Union (OAU), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and other 
regional and international organisations.  For differing periods, it chaired the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development, 1998 fifty-fourth session of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights and the Non-Aligned Movement. It also hosted the twelfth NAM 
summit in 1998 and in 1999, the Commonwealth heads of government 
meeting.34Mandela's position was to put South Africa on the map and urged the world to 
accept and provide the country with investments that would create wealth for the poor 
people. He was very vocal in blaming regimes that violated the rights of their citizens. He 
was also promoting justice, international morality and human rights. 
 
“For the first five years, the government of National Unity (GNU) was characterised by 
by two seemingly unrelated tendencies. First, South Africa made quite a name for itself 
as an active and leading player in the field of multilateral diplomacy. It then took on the 
leadership of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Southern Development Community (SADC) and 
the United Nations Human Rights Commission. It also played vital roles in securing the 
renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in effecting two normative 
innovations in international affairs: the Ottawa Treaty (1997) banning anti-personnel 
landmines and the Rome Statute (1998), G20+, the G8, Keyto Protocol Negotiations, the 
Campaign to ban land mines, Commonn Wealth, establishment of African Union (AU) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
South Africa’s domestic transformation. See Chhabra, H.S. 1997 South Africa’s Foreign Policy 
Principles─Options─Dilemas. New Delhi: Africa Publications. 
 
34 ‘Without exaggeration, President Mandela could therefore declare in1999: for a country that not so many 
years ago was the polecat of the world, South Africa has truly undergone a revolution in its relations with 
the international community. See Le Pere, G. and Van Nieukerk, A. 2002 The Evolution of South Africa’s 
Foreign  Policy, 1994─2000. In:McGowan, P..J. and Nel, P.  Eds. Power, Wealth and Global Equity An 
International Relations Texbook for Africa second edition.  Cape Town: UCT Press. 
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and setting up an International Criminal Court. In many respects, the ANC-led 
government has given South Africa a typical middle power foreign policy profile of a 
good citizen, committed to multilateral institutions and promoting moderate normative 
reform in global affairs”35  
 
It must not be forgotten that South Africa’s neighbours suffered great harm in aiding and 
supporting the struggle for liberation. A number of African countries such as Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana and others provided the ANC with material support and formal 
diplomatic recognition while in exile. Much of the continent enjoyed a special 
relationship with the ANC and vice versa and Africa’s elevation to a foreign policy 
priority is thus not suprising. There was a certain symmetry between the ethical and 
normative constructs of the ANC’s domestic policies and idealist foundations of its 
foreign policy emphasis on justice, democracy and human rights was reflected in the 
above foreign policy principles. The government’s initial economic framework called the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) for example also referred to the 
importance of rebuilding the South African economy in partnership with its regional 
neighbours and the necessity for integrating trade and foreign policy as part of a broader 
strategic approach strengthening South-South Co-operation.( Mda  2003:54)  
 
Mandela’s government was faced with a challenge of transforming some of the 
instruments of foreign policy such as the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The 
foreign policy was aimed in attempts to ward off international sanctions and diplomatic 
isolation. Mandela government had to incorporate the foreign affairs departments and 
their diplomatic representatives of the former homelands such as Transkei, 
Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC). These TBVC departments were only 
recognised by the South African government. The TBVC diplomats were retained 
following the compromise that was made during inter-party negotiations at the World 
Trade Centre outside Johannesburg. The department had to deal with the issues of gender 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
35 Prof Gerrit, Olivier. Address by Director of the University of Johannesburg Centre for European Studies 
and former Ambassador to Moscow during the Round table discussion at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Johannesburg, 14 June 2005.   
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and racial imbalances. The Department of Foreign Affairs as it was still dominated by 
male white Afrikaners for example, Rusty Evans, who was the Director-General. The 
status improved when Jackie Selebi, who was an ANC diplomat, was appointed as the 
new Director-General.36 “In 2000 most of South Africa’s career diplomats were black the 
total non-politically appointed staff were black and 60% white. Although attempts were 
made to develop conceptual coherence, strategic direction and operational codes, 
cleavages of race, gender, style and ideology persisted.”37
 
Nelson Mandela articulated the thrust of foreign policy in the post-apartheid South Africa 
before he became the President.  He said, ‘Human rights will be light that guides our 
foreign policy.’ Although the guiding principles were clear, the strategies, goals, 
objectives and plans were hardly clear cut as some might have expected. Nevertheless, 
Pretoria African policy, which assumed primacy in the country’s foreign policy, was very 
clear. Its stated aim was to put in place the requisite conditions to advance the ideals of 
the African Renaissance, as the problems and challenges facing the subregion require a 
collective response from all countries of the South. Minister Nzo said, ‘ the promotion 
and attainment of a state of peace and prosperity for our own citizens as well as the 
citizens of our region, continent and planet. This is derived from the belief that there can 
be no prosperity without peace, but also no peace without prosperity, both within 
countries and between countries as well as developed and developing worlds.38   
 
Mandela took on the Suharto regime in Indonesia over human rights in East Timor and 
sent a delegation to assist in the resolution of the Northern Ireland question. He also 
attempted to convene Angolans to talk to each other, to resolve their own internal 
problems, but the ruling Movimento Popular de Libertanauo de Angola (MPLA) was 
                                                          
36 Ibid… 
 
37 Alden, C.  and Le Pere, G.  South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy─from Reconciliation to 
Revival? Adelphi Paper 362. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
38 Mandela’s commitment to a human driver foreign policy was vindicated when took on the Nigerian 
crook Sani Abacha after the murder of Ken Saro Wiwa. Tshwane argued for Nigeria’s suspension from the 
commonwealth in 1995. See Dlamini, K. 2003/04 South Africa Foreign Policy since 1994. In: SA 
Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.   
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upset when Jonas Savimbi, head of the rebel Uniao Nasional pour a Independencia Total 
d’Angola (UNITA) movement visited South Africa and was given what was perceived 
good treatment. Pretoria’s varied approach demonstrates the complexities that are 
involved in making foreign policy choices, resulting in succession in pursuit of national 
interest.39
 
It should be noted that, President Mandela determined the foreign policy agenda without 
much criticism or sanction from other opposition leaders. The decision to write off 
Namibia’s debt of R800 million was made during the president’s state visit to that 
country without any cabinet deliberations or consultation with the ANC, let alone 
opposition parties. Highly personilised styles of policymaking and decision making were 
common then, but even more common today under Mbeki presidency. Mandela’s 
towering personality, international prestige, and stature made him an important figure in 
South Africa’s foreign relations. His command and seeming domination of every cabinet, 
parliament, and the DFA. As a consequence, policy often followed president’s public 
statements, rather than the other way round. Nonetheless, ideally the cabinet and to lesser 
extent, the parliament should remain the checks and balances on presidential authority. 
Procedurally, the president has to consult with and get the approval of the cabinet on 
every major foreign policy decision.40    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 Ibid… 
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2.5 Foreign Policy during Mbeki years (1999─2005) 
 
‘I am an African 
I owe by being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the 
glades, the rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the 
ever changing seasons that define our native land. My body has 
frozen in our frosts and in our latter day snows. It has thawed in the 
warmth of our sunshine and melted in the heat of the midday sun. 
The crack and the rumble of the summer thunders lashed by 
startling lightning have been a cause of trembling and of hope. The 
dramatic shapes of the Drakensburg, the soil coloured waters of the 
lekoa, iGqili noThukela and sands of the Kgalagadi, have all been 
panels of the set on the natural stage on which we act out the foolish 
deeds of the theatre of our day. A human presence among all these a 
feature on the face of a native land thus defined, I know none dare 
challenge me when I say─I am an African’41
  
This phase represents South Africa’s foreign policy during the second term of democratic 
government. Mbeki took over as President from Mandela and new foreign Affairs 
Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was appointed. After Thabo Mbeki was inaugurated 
in June 1999 as a President of the country several changes were made to the national 
bureaucratic or policy-making machinery which was believed to be fragmented, costly 
and inefficient. The key area was the need to restructure the Presidency, which is the 
centre of the foreign policy formulation and decision-making. Careful planning and 
preparation went into the restructuring process. The recommendations of a Presidential 
Review Committee, appointed in 1996, together with various analysis by the office of 
then Deputy President, were implemented immediately after Mbeki took office and were 
effectively concluded by late 1999. The relevant main features of the Presidency are, first 
the staff of 341 functions as a central secretariat or Cabinet Office and integrated 
Presidency, which its vision is commitment to efficiency and effective executive 
management of government by the president and the cabinet. Second, three political 
                                                                                                                                                                             
40 See Venter, D. 2001 South African Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in African context. In: Khadiagala, 
M. and Lyons, T. Eds. African Foreign Policies Power and Process. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers.  
 
41 Mbeki T. 1996 I am an African, [Online] Available from: 
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figures-President, Deputy President and Minister belong to the same office, with an 
integrated administrative establishment managed by one Director General.42  
 
Table 2.1: The Presidency  
 
Political incumbents 
 
♦ The President, Mr Thabo Mbeki 
♦ The Deputy President, Mrs  Phumzile Mlambo-
Ngcuka 
♦ The Minister in the Presidency, Dr Essop Pahad 
 
The Administration 
Head of the Presidency, Rev Frank Chikane 
♦ Private Office of the President 
♦ Private office of the Deputy President 
♦ Cabinet Office 
♦ Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services Unit 
 
Source: McGowan, P. J. and Philip, N. eds (2002:55)  
 
Although, is noted that there has been a degree of continuity in foreign policy from 
Mandela to the Mbeki’s era, there has been a shift, which focused more on Africa. Mbeki 
appreciates that at the core of wealth creation and security is the promotion of democracy 
and human rights in parts of the world that lack them, especially Africa. The Mbeki 
presidency places emphasis on making South African foreign policy more predictable 
and proactive in order to shape world events and deal with regional problems. There are 
three main reasons for this. First South Africa is Africa’s powerhouse in economic, 
                                                          
 
42  Van Nieukerk, A. and Le Pere, G. Op Cit. pp. 253─256. 
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political and military terms. Second, South Africa is a key member of the developing 
world. In this role, it acts as a de facto champion of the interests of the South in 
international and multilateral arenas. Third, its constitution embraces outstanding norms 
and values that are widely seen as models for most countries to emulate, to promote those 
norms and values in Pretoria back-yard-Africa. Largely as a result of this, the 
international community has accorded Tshwane a key role in international affairs.43  
 
President Mbeki is a very skilled statesman in the sense that while still in exile, he was 
the ANC’s chief diplomat, and his outlook is distinctly internationalist. Like Mandela, he 
has had a hand in fashioning the contours of South Africa’s foreign relations. He has been 
the prime architect of reconfiguring South Africa’s relations with Africa by articulating a 
visionary policy framework around the concept of an African renaissance, which 
advocates a renewal of African continent by seeking African solutions to African 
problems. In addition, the Co-ordination and Implementation Unit (CIU) in the office of 
the president facilitates coordination across all government departments. “However, 
Mbeki’s drive to centralise control and run a backroom presidency which can be seen, for 
example in the creation of a president’s office in excess of 330 personnel and his control 
over key appointments as well as the circumvention of parliament in policymaking is in 
itself an illustration of the fine balance between legitimate structuring to ensure effective 
performance and an authoritarian government. Yet there is a need to imbue the 
professionals in the Foreign Service with a sense of purpose and direction. They should 
know where they are heading and what role they can play in contributing constructively 
to stated goals.”44  
 
Mbeki’s era has been characterised by Afro-centrism where, the voice of Africans should 
be heard by other bigger nations. The Mbeki’s African Renaissance also dominated, as he 
asked for Africans to unite towards creating peace and development of the African 
continent. This started when he made his famous speech, ‘I’m an African’. He 
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emphasised the issue of multilateralism and non-interference in internal affairs of the 
state for example the Zimbabwe crises, Haiti, Cuba and others. The role of regional and 
international organisations such as Southern African Development Community, the 
African Union and the United Nations have been in the centre of Mbeki’s era in foreign 
policy.45  
 
President Mbeki has been promoting multilateralism before unilateralism in dealing with 
issues of international affairs. Pretoria has consistently favoured acting in consent with 
others to find collective solutions to global and regional problems. During the Iraqi war, 
South Africa was outspoken and criticised the unilateral approach by the US. They 
emphasised the multilateral approach, which was to be done true to the recommendations 
of the United Nations. During the Mbeki presidency, foreign policy became more 
oriented towards further elevating South Africa’s profile in international affairs through 
an assertive approach at the international institutions such as the African Union (AU), the 
WTO, the World Bank, SADC and others. 46   
 
President Mbeki is one of the chief architects of the AU.  The AU replaced OAU and the 
initiatives of the latter paved the way for the birth of the former. The constitutive act of 
the African Union was adopted in 2000 at Lome in Togo and entered into force in 2001. 
The vision of the AU is to accelerate socio-economic integration of the continent, which 
will lead, to unity and solidarity between African countries and people. South Africa 
currently chairs the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU.47 President Mbeki is 
also one of the founders of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development                             
(NEPAD) which was adopted at the Lusaka summit in 2001. NEPAD was established as 
a way of recovery plan for Africa. These include accelerating growth and development 
and promotion of democracy and good governance in Africa. NEPAD gave birth to 
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Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which its main purpose is to promote 
democracy and good governance. South Africa will be third country to be reviewed by 
APRM after Ghana and Malawi.  The major focus of South Africa’s involvement in these 
institutions is the promotion of human rights and disarmament and the issue of reforming 
the UN. This is to ensure that the weak, poor, rich and powerful states are equal and have 
same voices.48
 
Mbeki’s government has also been a keen supporter of rules-based international system. 
Pretoria’s foreign policy activities are the continuous promotion of the interests of the 
South in the international community49. During the global trade talks in Seattle, South 
Africa together with India and Brazil were in the forefront of the formation of the G20+ 
group of developing countries that challenged the hegemony of the rich industrial nations 
in global trade relations. There has been a link between foreign policy and domestic 
policy as the President Mbeki travelled abroad to sign bilateral and multi-lateral trade 
agreements in order to attract foreign direct investment, so that poor South Africans could 
benefit.  The other pre-requisite in Mbeki’s era has been security, which requires a 
number of processes such as adherence to international law, conflict prevention and 
mediation and promotion of democratic and stable regimes. This is seen as a prerequisite 
for South Africa to become a prosperous nation that can outgrow its developing country 
status. 50   
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2.6 Mbeki’s African Renaissance 
 
‘I am an African. I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. 
The pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Burundi and Algeria experience is a pain that I also bear. 
The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degration of my 
continent is a blight that we share. The blight on our happiness that 
derives from this and from our drift to the periphery of the ordering 
of human affairs leaves us in a persistent shadow of despair. This is 
a savage road to which nobody should be condemned. Whatever the 
difficulties, Africa shall be at peace! However improbable it may 
sound to the sceptics, Africa will prosper! Whoever we may be, 
whatever our immediate interest, however much we have been 
caught by the fashion of cynicism and loss of faith in the capacity of 
the people, let us say today nothing can stop us now!’ 
‘An Africa Renaissance must bring an end to these dictatorships and 
to the civil wars that have given Africa the distinction of having the 
largest number of refugees in the world. This business of television 
pictures showing Africans fleeing war or repression, or dying of 
desperate hunger because of instability─that must end.’51
 
President Mbeki reinvented the concept of African Renaissance. This means the rebirth 
or revival of the African continent to achieve political and economic development. This 
was not a new concept in Africa. African Renaissance has been in existence during the 
times of former president of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah and Former Tanzanian leader 
Julius Nyerere. Mbeki’s renaissance has been the revival of the vision of these prominent 
leaders to unite the continent and achieving peace and economic prosperity. In February 
1999 the DFA published a policy document for a higher profile and more assertive action 
by foreign affairs ministry in both wealth creation and security. It envisages wealth 
creation through globalisation, the enhancement of South Africa’s image abroad, and 
vigorous pursuit of trade and investment, compliance with international law and active 
engagement in conflict prevention, management and resolution would be key to security. 
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An additional concern of promoting democratisation and a culture of human rights has 
recently emerged to supplement the aims of creating wealth and security. These 
objectives reflect President Mbeki’s vision of a South African foreign policy anchored in 
both the developing and developed worlds. 
 
There have been a number of debates in South Africa about the notion of African 
Renaissance. Despite the fact that renaissance denotes a process of rebirth, renewal, 
revival, revitilisation, reawakening and self-reinvention, Africa is far from such revival, 
because it is pathologically diseased, drug addicted, malnourished patient. Mbeki expects 
South Africa to lead a renewal of the continent and project the cause of the developing 
world in international institutions. He believes that South Africa will achieve its foreign 
objective of contributing to Africa’s rebirth if it can lead global reforms. Hence, as the 
most powerful African actor, South Africa seeks a major role in economic development 
issues. Since these goals cannot be attained unilaterally, South Africa has tried to obtain 
the co-operation of key international players to reshape the debates about changes in the 
multilateral system.  President Mbeki has advanced the notion of an African renaissance 
since May 1999, as a foreign policy goal. This notion includes securing the establishment 
of genuine and stable democracies in Africa, mobilisung efforts against corruption and 
implementing economic reforms to attract foreign direct investment. These views 
dovetail with the ANC’s own foreign policy document, which has put the concept of an 
African renaissance as the main pillar of its international policy. However, these foreign 
policy proclamations need to be evaluated on the basis of whether the idea of the African 
renaissance lacks conceptual clarity and operational significance, problems that are 
compounded by its obscure linkage with African identity and African-ness. In addition, it 
is being articulated at a time when the African continent is best known by conflict and 
discord rather than peace and stability. 52
 
It looks uncertain that the quantity of institutional forms or structures will be sufficient to 
rehabilitate Africa unless the continent in particular its leaders unconditionally 
                                                          
52 See the discussion paper of the African National Congress (ANC), ‘ Developing a Strategic Perspective 
on South African Foreign Policy.’  
 32
acknowledges and admits its problems, develops a sufficient understanding of the 
problem, expresses a desire and exhibits an unwavering will to solve the problems. 
Before Africa can be revived, it has to first deal with a number of obstacles. These 
include encouraging political pluralism and civic nationalism, abuse of power, promoting 
development, human rights, good governance and accountability and conflict 
prevention.53
  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
During the last ten years South Africa has transformed itself from a pariah state into a 
most respectable player in the international system. Pretoria’s foreign policy has also 
evolved and it has been directed towards non-violation of human rights. Both Mandela 
and Mbeki played a central role in shaping the South Africa’s foreign policy. The 
interventions of South Africa in African conflicts have been geared towards achieving 
peace and stability in the continent at the same time ensuring the non-violation of human 
rights. During Mandela and Mbeki eras Pretoria has been strongly involved in mediation 
efforts in Africa notable in Lesotho during Mandela and Burundi during Mbeki’s terms in 
office. However, some of these efforts have been criticised because of the controversies 
that surround the third party intervention in internal affairs of other states. It is this reason 
why the next chapter, clearly discusses and explains the legalities regarding third party 
interventions.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3. LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERVENTION IN CONFLICT- 
     TORN COUNTRIES IN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapter overviewed South Africa’s foreign policy in particular its engagements 
in Africa in trying to resolve conflict between the warring parties. It also discusses how 
Pretoria’s foreign policy has evolved since early nineties to  focus on the African 
continent. This chapter examines the legal basis for these interventions as opposed to 
principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. It is divided into two sections. First, the 
legal basis of state sovereignty and third party interventions is being examined. This is 
explained through the reference to the UN Charter, AU principles and the views of other 
authors and intellectuals. Second, the legal basis of South Africa’s involvement in 
African conflicts such as in Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Burundi and particularly Lesotho where 
South Africa was strongly criticised by many analysts as an invader in that country.   
 
3.2 Legal principles regarding state sovereignty and third party 
interventions 
 
‘In the wake of recent humanitarian crises and varying international 
responses to such situations, the debate with respect to international 
intervention on humanitarian grounds has grown dramatically. There 
are calls for more intervention, while at the same time, many of those 
who might be targets of intervention have raised the specter of 
sovereignty claiming the domestic jurisdiction for their genocidal acts 
while there is increasing international support for interventions to 
respond to a variety of humanitarian crises. The issue of the legitimacy 
of such actions by the United Nations or other bodies has not been fully 
articulated.’54
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After the establishment of United Nations Organisation in 1945, the principle of 
sovereignty was pre-eminent, prohibiting the intervention of states in the internal affairs 
of others. International Law also prohibited any intervention by third parties in conflicts. 
However, since the end of the Cold War this has changed significantly. The gross 
violation of human rights by governments, such as discrimination based on sex, colour, 
religion and resulting in acts of genocide led to a number of third-party interventions in 
countries such as Burundi, Rwanda, Kosovo, Israel-Palestine, Liberia and Sudan.  
 
Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights located in the UN Charter and 
article 3 of the African Union Constitutive Act provides the justification for these 
interventions. Some of the legalities regarding third party intervention are: 
♦ First, the right of the union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of 
the assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity;  
♦ Second, when the member states request intervention from the union in order to 
restore peace and security;  
♦ Third, when there is no respect for the sanctity of human life, the condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive 
activities; and  
♦ Fourth, in an event when there is an unconstitutional change of government e.g. a 
coup.55  
 
Kapil (2001) argues that interventions could be defined as an action undertaken on the 
territory, air space or territorial waters of a state against the wishes of its government. 
Four possible criteria that could be considered when justifying intervention are: 
♦ Gross and systematic human right abuses, including genocide; 
♦ The suppression of the clearly demonstrated will of the majority, such as the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government; 
                                                          
55 See African Union, Available from http://www.africa-union.org. 
 35
♦ Clear cases of failed states, where the central authority is non-functioning and civilian 
population is at the mercy of militias, warlords, or criminal gangs, among others and 
♦ The illegal and inhumane use of power by one side or the other during a civil war 
encompassing an attempt at secession and or ethnic/religious self-determination.56  
The legal status of humanitarian intervention is highly contested. However, one can say 
at the outset that, in general, intervention violates most interpretations of customary as 
well as codified international law. The basis of this prohibition is the recognised status as 
sovereignty. This literally means that states are regarded as the primary unit of 
organisation and political integrity in international affairs. International law has been 
mostly concerned with what happens between states rather than what happens inside the 
state.  The treatment of nationals was generally outside the purview of International Law. 
This is reflected in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which states: “All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the 
purpose of the United Nations.” Article 51 of the UN Charter codified another 
controversial principle of international law, which allowed the use of force by a state in 
self-defence. Many countries have suffered attacks by other countries, for example in Iraq 
the US used a pre-emptive strike claiming that their national security was under threat 
from terrorists using chemical weapons or weapons of mass destruction. However, at the 
same time individuals are also considered subjects of international law.57
 
To ensure the protection of individuals as subjects of international law, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was passed in 1948. Article 2 states that, ‘Everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of 
any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, region, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to 
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which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or any 
under other limitation of sovereignty’. Article 3 states that everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of a person. Last, Article 5 states that no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.58  
 
Cawthra (2004) argues that the end of the Cold War saw a groundswell of practice and 
opinion moving towards a concept of relative or even earned sovereignty for states and a 
concomitant commitment to uphold human rights, even if this meant military intervention 
in cases of extreme abuse. It is for this reason that former UN Secretary General, 
Boutros-Boutros Ghali, declared in 1992 that the time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty had passed, as its theory was never matched by reality. It also spawned the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Present, it is widely accepted, although not 
universally, and has been incorporated into the principles of the AU and multi-national 
organisations. 59
 
Cawthra (2004) further argues that many critics regard intervention as fine in principle, 
but difficult in practice.  The problem is that the doctrine appears to be applied 
selectively. Despite the fact that the concept of absolute sovereignty was never really 
adhered to, it managed to bring some stability into the system of states. If humanitarian 
intervention is to be treated in the same manner, some clear rules need to be laid down.  
This issue has become more imperative in the context of the war against terror in which 
selective intervention has become a strategic necessity. It is now becoming increasingly 
clear that sovereignty will not protect weak states against external interventions by 
powerful states.60    
 
‘The new mantra in international is the slogan of human security. This concept is 
juxtaposed to the traditional concept of state/national security. State security rests upon 
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the concepts of state sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs and non-
aggression. In other words, sovereign states have the obligation to respect the sovereignty 
of other states and to assure their security. Can the security of a state guarantee human 
security within that state? Should inter-state relations also guarantee human security, 
irrespective of the citizenship of the human beings involved? These have become the 
moot questions of the recent decades.’61
          
These are fundamental questions that states deal with when intervening in the internal 
matters of others. Many autocratic and brutal regimes use the notion of sovereignty to try 
and hide the human rights abuses that they commit towards the citizens. Naidu (2005) 
points out that Article 1(2) of the UN Charter states that when obtaining independence, a 
sovereign state acquires certain guarantees. First, domestic jurisdiction, which means that 
no external force, can interfere in the internal affairs of the state without the request or 
the consent of the state concerned. This principle is known as non-intervention as 
provided in article 2(7). Second, no state has a right of aggression or breach of the peace 
and even the threat to the peace of Article 39 of the Charter. Third, Article 51 of the 
Charter gives the sovereign states the right to self-defense.62      
However, Naidu (2005) points out that if there is a violation of human rights, then 
intervention is necessary. He clearly states that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted by the UN on 10 December 1948, where the recognition of the 
inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
are the foundations of freedom, justice and peace in the world. Most importantly, Article 
3 says, ‘Everyone has the right to life’. This gives the UN the mandate to intervene in any 
country that seems to be violating this law. 
 
According to Adebajo and Rashid (2004), the African Union inherited the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU’s) existing conflict prevention, management and resolution 
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machinery. The AU, through its Constitutive Act of Union, has a political mandate to 
intervene against members who violate principles of good governance and the rule of 
law─ an element that clearly sets the organisation apart from its predecessor, the OAU. 
The Constitutive Act automatically becomes law in all African countries that have signed 
and rectified it.  However, tensions remain high between the principles and objectives 
outlined in the AU’s Constitutive Act, such as intervention in the internal affairs of 
member states. The African Union explicitly recognises the right of intervention in three 
specific cases: First, if a regime has been toppled through unconstitutional means, notably 
through a military coup, second in cases of genocide, last, if instability in one country 
threatens broader stability in any African sub-region.63 A recent notable successful 
application of this act was during the unconstitutional change of power in Togo. After the 
death of Africa’s long serving President Gnassingbe Eyadema, the military installed his 
son, Faure Gnassingbe. The international community and the AU, in particular, 
condemned this and Faure was forced to step down to restore constitutional rule.    
 
 
 
3.3 Legitimacy of South Africa’s engagements in African conflicts 
 
During the past five years South Africa has been intervening in a number of African 
conflicts. The question that many people ask, is the legitimacy of South Africa’s 
mediation efforts. 
 
Responding to the deteriorating situation in Cote d’Ivoire in 2004, the AU appointed the 
South African President Thabo Mbeki, as its mediator. This choice came as no surprise in 
view of South Africa’s chairmanship of the newly established AU Peace and Security 
Council. South Africa is also regarded as the African country best equipped to play a 
meaningful role in peace mediation because of peaceful transition from an apartheid 
regime to democratically elected government.  In addition, many analysts believed that 
the involvement of a third party from outside the West African region might achieve 
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positive results. However, South Africa’s diplomatic engagements with Côte d’ Ivoire to 
resolve the conflict received mixed reactions. French President Jacque Chirac expressed 
the opinion that South Africa not only lacked sufficient knowledge about the nature of the 
conflict in the region, but also lacked a clear strategy to deal with the conflict.64  
 
However, President Mbeki has managed to hold several talks with rebel leaders and 
President Gbagbo. A progress was made, when peace talks resumed in Tshwane from 3-6 
April 2005. It was the first time after the French-brokered Marcoussis agreement, that the 
warring parties sat down to hold discussions under the same roof. Those in attendance 
included President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Seydou Diarra Soro, Chief rebel leader 
Guillame Soume, former President Henri Konan Bedie and former Prime Minister 
Allasane Ouattara. The outcome of the meeting was fruitful as all parties agreed to halt 
all kinds of hostilities and disarm their rebels. On 26 April President Gbagbo made a big 
concession when he agreed to use his constitutional powers in Article 48, which allow for 
the president to take extra-ordinary measures when institutions or territorial integrity is at 
stake. Gbagbo allowed his main opposition rival Alaissane Ouattara to stand in the 
October 2005 elections. Many citizens and the international community have applauded 
this move and are hoping for peace in this country. The international community, 
including the UN, commended South Africa’s mediating role.  
 
However, despite South Africa’s progress in helping the opposing parties in Côte d’Ivoire 
to reach a resolution, it is too early to celebrate. Pivotal presidential elections should have 
been held on 30 October, when President Laurent Gbagbo’s mandate expired, but weeks 
before the scheduled polling day mediators and UN officials agreed that a vote was 
impossible due to “intransigence” by the warring factions. Now, under AU proposals the 
UN has backed, Gbagbo is to remain in office for up to 12 more months, with the new 
prime minister bearing the task of organising the delayed polls. South Africa will 
continue to play a leading role in resolving the conflict.65
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“The involvement of Mbeki in Côte d’Ivoire was never doubted as illegitimate by the 
international community as it has been under the auspices of the AU Peace and Security 
Council. South Africa efforts have been strongly supported by the United Nations 
Security Council. Moreover, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has also supported these engagements in trying to bring about peace and 
stability in this country that used to be a political haven and a leading economic power in 
West Africa, the largest exporter of cocoa and a significant producer of coffee, palm oil 
and gold. The country has now gone into an economic tailspin after the conflict broke 
out.” 66
 
In August 1999, a SADC meeting mandated former South African President Nelson 
Mandela, the then chairman of SADC, to intervene in the DRC conflict in consultation 
with the OAU Secretary General. The differences of opinion with Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe, who headed the SADC security committee, constrained Mandela’s 
mediation efforts. Western powers most notable the US, had long supported the 
authoritarian regime of Mobutu Sese Seko as a bulwark against communism. “However, 
with the end of the Cold War, his regime came under pressure to democratise. The other 
regimes that were in a spot light to democritise were Yoweri Museveni’s government in 
Uganda, Paul Kagame administration and the in Rwanda and the Banyamulenge Alliance 
Democratiques Pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL) under the leadership of Laurent-
Desire Kabila, a veteran of the Simba rebellion of 1964─65. Mandela’s mediation efforts 
between Mobutu and Kabila did little to break the impasse. Less than two months later, 
Kabila’s troops marched into Kinshasa. A dying and defeated Mobutu was hounded out 
of the then Zaire with his tail between his legs. A few weeks later, Kabila was sworn in as 
president renaming the country DRC. However, rather than establishing a broad-based 
regime, Kabila alienated many forces which had previously been opposed to Mobutu, and 
his AFDL regime rapidly became viewed as Tutsi oppressors, even though Kabila and 
most AFDL leaders were actually drawn from non-Tutsi ethnic groups. After his 
assassination in 2001, Kabila’s son Joseph took over as Congo’s new leader.  His style of 
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leadership was different from that of his father and he was keen to bring all the warring 
parties together in order to bring about peace and stability in the country.”67
 
Mbeki then took over from Mandela and his efforts paid dividends right from the 
beginning. Mbeki’s personal involvement helped to broker an end to the five-year civil 
war in the DRC, which has remained volatile since the rebellion against the late President 
Mobutu Sese Seko in the early 1990s.68
 
Throughout, 2002 and part of 2003, the South African government hosted the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue, bringing together under one roof the government of the DRC’s 
President Joseph Kabila, rebel factions and unarmed opposition groups, at Sun City. The 
key developments were: the signing of a memorandum of understanding by Joseph 
Kabila and Kagame in July 2002, whereby the latter agreed to the withdrawal of 
Rwandan troops and dismantling of the Rwandan Armed Forces and Rwandan Hutu 
militias in the DRC. A similar memorandum was signed between Joseph Kabila and 
President Museveni of Uganda, providing for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the 
DRC and for normalisation of relations between the two countries. The culmination of 
the process was the agreement reached on an interim constitution between competing 
DRC political groups at Sun City. This allowed for Kabila to remain as President of a 
transitional government, but with four vice-presidents provided by the three major 
parties, the Kabila government, Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Congolese Rally for Democracy, 
and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo and the remaining opposition, the 
Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (RCD) to take control of the Ministry of 
Defence, and for holding of an election within two years. A historical event occurred in 
the DRC in May 2005, when the country’s constitution was formally adopted.  Mbeki and 
his ministers were eventually rewarded with a fragile peace deal and arguably South 
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Africa’s first success in mediating in an African conflict.69In sum, there is no doubt that 
South Africa’s involvement in DRC has been legal, because of the support it got from the 
international community, in particular the OAU, the UN and the SADC. In fact, the 
leaders of SADC officially appointed Mandela to intervene in the conflict. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the legal basis for the third party intervention. Three main 
issues have been observed that the international law recognises a right to unilateral 
humanitarian intervention by groups of states and regional actors in internal conflicts. 
First, when there have been human rights abuses so egregious as to violate the norms of 
the international law. Second, when a government has collapsed and is spiralling into a 
state of anarchy. Last, to safeguard democracy when a democratic regime has been 
violently overthrown against the will of its domestic population. Looking at the 
involvement of South Africa in conflict torn countries highlighted above one may argue 
the mediation efforts were legitimate because its interventions has been due to these 
factors mentioned above. However, the greater analysis of legitimacy of South Africa’s 
engagement in Africa is debated in the following next two chapters where a comparative 
study of Burundi and Lesotho is made. These two chapters compare and contrast the 
conflict in two countries, South Africa’s engagements and legitimacy of its involvement. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  
4. SOUTH AFRICA’S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa’s led intervention in Lesotho in 1998 created a lot of debate about its legal 
basis. Some analysts said South Africa wanted to act as a big brother, others argued that 
Lesotho should be South Africa’s tenth province. In unpacking these views, this chapter 
does a case study of Lesotho by analysing South Africa’s foreign policy towards Lesotho 
crisis. The arguments on legal basis of South Africa’s military intervention (Operation 
Boleas) are clearly explained. The operation did not go well as a result Pretoria was 
strongly criticised and there were lessons that were learnt during the intervention. These 
are also outlined in this chapter. 
 
4.2 Political and economic overview of Lesotho 
 
The Kingdom of Lesotho is a landlocked country entirely surrounded by South Africa. 
The official languages are English and Sesotho. About 90% of the population are 
Christians. The largest denominations are the Roman Catholic, Evangelical and Anglican 
churches. The population is about 2.8 million and the capital is Maseru.70 Lesotho is an 
hereditary monarchy, under the terms of the constitution, which came into effect 
following the 1993 election. The king, who is the Head of State, has no executive or 
legislative powers. The college of chiefs is theoretically empowered under traditional 
law, to elect and depose the king by a majority vote. Executive power is vested in the 
cabinet, which is headed by the Prime Minister. Legislative power is exercised by the 
National Assembly, which is elected at intervals of no more than five years through 
multi-party political system. A system of mixed member proportional representation was 
introduced at the general elections of May 2002 when the National Assembly was 
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expanded to 120 members, 80 elected by simple majority in single-member 
constituencies and 40 selected from party lists. The upper house, the senate comprises 
traditional chiefs and 11 nominated members. Lesotho comprises 10 administrative 
districts each with an appointed district co-ordinator. 71    
 
In terms of economy, according to estimates in 2002, Lesotho’s gross national income 
(GNI) was $981 million equivalent to $470 per head. During 1990-2002, it was estimated 
that the population increased at an average annual rate of 1.8%, while gross domestic 
product (GDP) per head increased in real terms at an average annual rate of 3.9%. 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing contributed 16.7% of GDP in 2002, and employed some 
37.6 % of the labour force in mid-2001. The principal agricultural exports are wool and 
mohair, cereals and live animals. The main subsistence crops are maize, sorghum and 
wheat. Industry including mining, manufacturing, construction and power provided 
41.6% of GDP and engaged 27.9% of the labour force. Mining contributed 0.1% of GDP 
and Lesotho has reserves of diamonds, which during the late 1970s provided more than 
50% of visible export earnings, but large scale exploitation of these ceased in 1982. 
However, it is planned to reopen the Setseng-Lou Terai mine and industrial mining at 
other sites is envisaged. Lesotho also processes deposits of uranium, lead and iron ore 
and is believed to have petroleum deposits.  
 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) provides hydro-electricity sufficient for 
all Lesotho’s needs and for export to South Africa. Phase 1A and 1B were inaugurated in 
1998 and 2004 respectively. The scheme is expected to be completed by about 2030. 
Prior to the LHWP more than 90% of Lesotho’s energy requirements were imported from 
South Africa. Lesotho is a member of the Common Monetary Area (with Namibia, South 
Africa and Swaziland) and a member of Southern African Customs Union─SACU (with 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Lesotho also belongs to the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC). Impediments to economic development in 
Lesotho include vulnerability to drought and serious land shortages, combined with the 
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country’s dependence on South Africa and the Lesotho currency, the Loti, is fixed at par 
with the South African rand, exposing Lesotho to fluctuations within the South African 
economy.72  
 
4.3 Background to the political crisis in Lesotho 
 
Lesotho was formerly Basutoland, a dependency of the United Kingdom. Since 
independence on 4 October 1966 from Great Britain, the political landscape in Lesotho 
has been characterised by perennial struggles between the military, the monarchy and the 
political parties. A constitutional crisis arose in December 1966, when King Moshoeshoe 
II attempted to obtain wider personal powers, but in January 1967 the King signed an 
undertaking to abide by the constitution. The Kingdom’s constitutions have since 
independence been modelled on the Westminster (British) system that requires the prime 
minister─the leader of the majority party─be head of government who wields executive 
power. Lesotho’s elections were run under First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system from 
independence up to 1998. The Prime Minister, like the other ministers has to be a 
Member of the Parliament. Lesotho’s four decades of independence have been marked by 
recurring political violence linked to elections. 73  
 
General elections took place in 1970, at which the opposition Basotho Congress Party 
(BCP) led by Ntsu Mokhehle appeared to have won the majority of seats in the national 
assembly. The BCP won 36 of the 60 seats in Parliament giving it 50% of the votes cast 
to the 23 seats of the BNP giving it 42% of the votes, on the other hand the remaining 
votes were cast in favour of the independent candidates. Chief Leobua Jonathan, the 
leader of Basotho National Party (BNP), which had governed the country with a slim 
parliamentary majority between 1965 and 1970, refused to accept the outcomes of the 
elections, instead he declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution and 
arrested several BCP organisers. The election was annulled and the legislature prorogued. 
King Moshoeshoe was placed under house arrest and subsequently exiled although he 
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returned after accepting a government order banning him from participating in politics. 
The country was under the Prime Minister’s personal control. An interim national 
assembly comprising the former senate and 60 members nominated by the cabinet was 
inaugurated in April 1973 and in July the state of emergency was revoked.74
 
However, the following a failed coup attempt in January 1974 by alleged BCP 
supporters, Chief Jonathan introduced stringent security laws. Mokhehle and other 
prominent members of the BCP went to exile. The party split into two factions, internal 
and external. The latter led by Mokhehle was supported by the Lesotho Liberation Army 
(LLA) which was responsible for number of attacks in Lesotho during the late 1970s and 
the 1980s. Jonathan continued to govern without popular support for the next 16 years. 
During this period, he attempted to gain some international credibility by allowing the 
establishment of the bases for the for the South African liberation movements such as 
African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This resulted to 
imposition of restrictions by apartheid government on the movements between the 
borders of South Africa and Lesotho. These restrictions had major impact on Lesotho’s 
economy.  
 
The parliament act of May 1983 repealed the emergency order of 1970 that had 
suspended the constitution. In January 1985 the national assembly was dissolved. 
Legislative elections scheduled for September were cancelled in August, when no 
opposition parties claimed that their prospective candidates had therefore prevented from 
securing sufficient signatories to qualify for nomination. The BNP candidates in all 60 
constituencies were returned to the office unopposed. On 20 January, Major General 
Justin Lekhonya, the head of the armed forces, overthrew Chef Jonathan’s government in 
a coup. A Military Council, chaired by Lekhanya was established. The council made a 
commitment to the establishment of a democratically elected civilian government by 
1992. The 1983 parliament act was revoked and it was announced that the executive and 
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legislative powers were to be vested in King Moshoeshoe, assisted by the military council 
suspended all formal political activity. Although the South African government denied 
having any part in the coup, the Lekhanya regime proved to be more amenable to South 
Africa’s regional security policy. In March 1986 it was announced that the two countries 
had reached an informal agreement whereby neither would allow its territory to be used 
for attacks against the other. In addition, the Lesotho government did not join other 
African states in pressing for international economic sanctions against South Africa. The 
military council also signed an agreement with South Africa that initiated the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project. The aim was to exploit the abundant water resources of Lesotho 
to meet the needs of the expanding needs of South Africans in particular in areas like 
Pretoria, Witwatersrand, Vereeniging metropolitan region to the north and provide hydro-
electric power to Lesotho. Four dams with a potential capacity exceeding 8000 million 
cubic metres were to be constructed at Maloti Mountains and connected by tunnels, 
which would feed into the Vaal River catchment area. Thousands of jobs and 
development opportunities were forecast. However, it was argued that the constituted a 
rape of the environment, with benefits accruing primarily to South Africa, owing the 
inexperience of the military government negotiators. 75  
 
In May 1998 Mokhehle was allowed to return to Lesotho after 14 years in exile. In 1989 
the LLA was said to be disbanded and by 1990 the two factions of the BCP had 
apparently reunited under Mokhehle’s leadership. Lekhanya announced that general 
elections would take place during 1993. However, party political activity remained 
outlawed. In June 1990 a National Constituent Assembly (including Lekhanya, members 
of the council of ministers, representatives of banned political parties, traditional chiefs 
and business leaders) was to draft a new constitution and to prepare for national 
democratic elections. The interim administration was plagued by controversy in the form 
of cabinet corruption and replacement of exiled King Moshoeshoe II by his son Letsie III. 
On 30 April 1991, Lekhanya was deposed in a coup organised by disaffected army 
officers, whose members were dissatisfied with their salaries. Colonel Elias Phitsoane 
Ramaema succeeded Lekhanya as chairman of the military council. Ramaema repealed 
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the ban on political party activity and by July the national constituent assembly had 
completed the draft constitution. In May 1992 Lesotho and South Africa agreed to 
establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level.76  
 
After several postponements, the general elections were eventually held on 27 March 
1993. Eighteen parties nominated their candidates amidst allegations of misconduct. The 
military was accused of collusion with the BCP over a secret hand-over of power. 
Rumours were triggered by the fact that Ramaema and the BCP leader, Mokhehle had a 
common origin in the Berea district. The BNP also came under fire for alleged 
monopolisation of the media coverage of the elections. The brother of Retselisitsoe 
Sekhanyana, leader of the BNP held the post of the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, a position which he was accused of abusing. The BCP and 
BNP were the only parties to contest every constituency. The Marematlou Freedom Party 
(MFP) led by Moeketso Malebo was the only other serious contender, with candidates in 
51 constituencies. It was unlikely that there was going to be an outright winner. In terms 
of the new electoral law, campaigning or the display of party colours or symbols was 
forbidden on election day. The local media appeared to be at great to project their 
neutrality and no publicly expressed opinion favoured either of the two main parties over 
the other. The problems that arose on the election day were failure of polling stations to 
open on time, inadequate ballot papers and voters turning up to vote at the wrong polling 
stations.   
 
The BCP secured all 65 seats in the new national assembly, winning 54% of the votes 
cast. As a consequence of majoritarian constituency-based electoral systems, the 
parliamentary representation of opposition parties were curtailed, inspite 25% of votes 
cast in the elections, the opposition parties between them won no representation in 
parliament. Contrary, the BCP received 75% of votes and 100% of the seats in 
parliament. Although international observers pronounced the election to have been free 
and fair, the BNP which took 16% of the votes rejected the result alleging that there had 
been widespread of rigging and electoral fraud and later declined the new 
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administration’s offer of two seats in the restored senate. On 2 April Mokhehle was 
inaugurated as Prime Minister and King Letsie swore allegiance to new constitution 
under the terms of which he remained Head of State with no executive or legislative 
powers. The executive authority was vested in the cabinet.77
 
Table 4.1 General Election for the National Assembly, 1993  
 
Party  
 
No. of votes Percentage of vote No. of seats 
BCP 398 355 74.7 65 
BNP 120 686 22.6 0 
MFP 7 650 1.4 0 
Other 6 287 1.2 0 
Total 532 978 100 65 
 
Source: Southall and Petlane (1995:30) 
 
In November a mutiny of about 50 junior officers in the national army, the Royal Lesotho 
Defence Force (RLDF) was apparently precipitated by a proposal to place the military 
under the command of a senior member of the LLA as part of the government efforts to 
integrate its former armed wing with the RLDF. Skirmishes near Maseru in January 1994 
escalated into more serious fighting between some 600-rebel troops and a 150 strong 
contingent of forces loyal to the government resulted in deaths of five soldiers and three 
civilians. Following the mediation efforts involving the representatives of Botswana, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, the Commonwealth, the OAU and the UN and a truce entered 
force, the rival factions surrendered their weapons and returned to barracks. However, in 
April the Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo was killed during an abduction 
attempt by disaffected troops. In the following month police officers demanding 
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increased pay and allowances briefly held hostage the acting finance minister, Mpho 
Malie. 
 
A commission to investigate the armed forces unrest of January and April 1944 began 
work in July. In that month Mokhehle appointed a commission of inquiry into the 
dethronement of King Moshoeshoe II. In August King Letsie petitioned the High Court to 
abolish the commission on the grounds of bias on the part of its members. On 17 August 
Letsie announced that he had dissolved the national assembly, dismissed the government 
and suspended sections of the constitution, citing popular dissatisfaction with the BCP 
administration. Although several thousands of people gathered outside the royal palace in 
Maseru in support of the deposed government, army and police support for Letsie’s royal 
coup was evident and subsequent clashes between demonstrators and the security forces 
reportedly resulted in five deaths.78
 
4.4 Crippling crisis and South Africa’s diplomatic effort 
 
The suspension of the constitution was widely condemned outside Lesotho. The 
Presidents of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe led diplomatic efforts to restore the 
elected government, supported by the OAU and the Commonwealth. The USA withdrew 
financial assistance and several other countries threatened sanctions. Following 
negotiations in South Africa in September 1994 King Letsie and Mokhehle signed an 
agreement guaranteed by Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe providing for the 
restoration of Moshoeshoe II as reigning monarch and for the restitution of the elected 
organs of government. The commission of inquiry into Moshoeshoe’s dethronement was 
to be abandoned, all those involved in the royal coup were granted amnesty from 
prosecution, the political neutrality of the armed forces and public service was to be 
guaranteed and consultations were to be undertaken with the aim of broadening the 
democratic process. Moshoeshoe was restored to the throne on 25 January 1995; 
undertaking not to interfere in politics and Letsie took the title of crown Prince. In 1995 
government representatives and military officials from Lesotho met with their 
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counterparts from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe to discuss progress in the 
restoration of constitutional order in Lesotho. The conference examined the 
recommendations of the commission of enquiry into the army mutiny of 1994. These 
included a streamlining of existing forces, a clearer definition of their functions and 
improved training. The leaders also adopted a diplomatic approach by condemning the 
coup and threatening economic sanctions unless the legitimate government was restored. 
After several deliberations, with South Africa putting more pressure, threats and military 
demonstration by South Africa on the border, agreement was reached early in September 
to restore Mokhehle’s government. A memorandum of understanding was drawn up, 
whereby troika became the guarantors of Lesotho’s democracy.79    
 
The process and outcome of the 1998 election was not fundamentally dissimilar from that 
of 1993 except in respect of the following: 
♦ An Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) administered the election. 
♦ The number of constituencies was further increased from 65 to 80 and this meant 
reconstruction of the constituencies and another rigorous process of constituency 
delimitation. 
♦ Voting age was brought down from 21 to 18 and this meant an increased challenge 
for voter information and education, and increase in the voting population. This in 
turn raised the anxiety of political parties as each prepared to capture the decisive 
youth vote.80 
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Table 4.2 General Elections for the National Assembly, 1998 
 
Party 
 
No. of Votes Percentage No. of seats 
LCD 355 049 60.7 79 
BNP 143 073 24.5 1 
BCP 61 793 10.5 0 
MFP 7 460 1.3 0 
Total 584 740 100.0 79 
 
Source: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Provisional Results, May 27, 1998.  
 
The 1998 election resulted in one-party rule with all the implications for legitimacy, 
representativeness and inclusiveness. The ruling Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) 
won 61% of votes but secured 79 seats out of 80 parliamentary seats. The BNP won 25% 
of votes but secured only one seat in the National Assembly while the MFP received 
about 1% of the votes but not even a single seat in Parliament. The Lesotho Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) and International observers declared the election process 
and its outcome more or less free and fair. The main opposition party felt cheated and the 
other parties felt excluded by the system. The opposition parties vented their anger in the 
street for they had no room in Parliament to challenge the ruling party. The alliance 
managed to intensify its mass mobilisation campaign by calling for an indefinite stay 
away until the government is in the hands of the people. After weeks of encampment 
outside the palace, the alliance strengthened its calls for the resignation of Prime Minister 
Pakalitha Mosisili (Mokhehle had retired after the elections) and his cabinet, and the 
formation of a government of national unity to steer country towards another election. 
They also urged King Letsie III to pronounce royal coup once again and dissolve 
government just as he had done in 1994. Political tensions rose and Lesotho teetered on 
the brink of civil war. Protestors locked gates of parliament and warned anyone 
tampering with the lock they did so at their peril. They went from door to door in 
 53
government buildings and commercial offices, ordering civil servants and staff to leave. 
Demonstrators also forced the Lesotho bank to close its doors.81   
 
 As internal efforts by various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) failed to bring the 
belligerent parties to the negotiations, external forces got increasingly involved. South 
Africa tried to resolve the dispute by sending a delegation to Maseru, made up of Mbeki, 
Nzo and Modise. A commission of inquiry comprising legal experts from Botswana, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe headed by Pius Langa of South African Constitutional Court 
was established. The main mandate of the Commision was to investigate allegations of 
irregularities during the election and make appropriate recommendations. The work of 
the commission proceeded at a very slow pace and the conflict kept escalating. When the 
Langa Commission came out on 17 September 1998, its substance and recommendations 
only hardened positions of the belligerent parties in that it was too ambivalent and 
inconclusive. It provided both sides with sufficient political missiles to fan the conflict 
more and more. Given its vagueness and inconclusiveness, the Langa Report provided 
another recipe for the escalation of the conflict. The military were drawn into a general 
conflagration that nearly sparked a civil war in Lesotho. 82
 
4.5 South African military intervention  
 
In responding to the deteriorating situation in Lesotho, at 6h30 South African time on 
Tuesday, 22 September 1998, 600 troops crossed the border into Lesotho in an armed 
intervention designed to quell the unrest in Maseru and purported mutiny of junior 
officers in the Lesotho army. This followed an appeal from the Prime Minister, Pakalitha 
Mosilili that his elected government was in danger of being overthrown by a creeping 
military coup. He asked help from SADC in general and South Africa in particular. The 
basis of Mosilili’s appeal was based on troika agreement that they will condemn all the 
unconstitutional change of democratically elected government. Lesotho’s plea came by 
chance, when Mandela, Mbeki and Nzo were all out of the country in different parts of 
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the world. Buthelezi an acting president at the time consulted by telephone all major 
figures abroad and the Botswana and Zimbabwe governments.  The probability is that the 
decision would have been the same, whoever had made it, but the absence of the three 
major figures when the crisis reached its boiling point, presented an image of poor 
intelligence, weak-co-ordination and indifference to regional problems within 
government as the senior figures in the Department of Foreign Affairs learned of the 
intervention on their radios. That was the beginning of peace enforcement by SADC 
operation in an effort to deal with the security situation in the mountain kingdom of 
Lesotho. The military intervention was called Operation Boleas. Although it was said to 
be a combined military task force, consisting of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF) and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), it was until nightfall on 22 
September that approximately 200 Botswana troops arrived in Maseru.83
 
The mission of the combined task force was to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent 
any further anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and 
order. The battle concept was described as the deployment of forces in order to locate and 
identify destabilisers, disarm, contain and strike where applicable with the necessary 
force to eliminate the threat. The two main objectives of the operation were: 
♦ To create a stable environment in Lesotho; and 
♦ To restore law and order to enable negotiations to take place between the political 
parties in Lesotho. 
 
Although South African government was strongly criticised as invading Lesotho, it 
insisted that military intervention did not constitute an invasion. The decision was based 
and justified by the fact that SADC was directly approached by the Prime Minister of 
Lesotho, Pakalithi Mosilili requested intervention on the basis that the intervention was 
based on agreements reached in SADC, that all attempts at peacefully resolving the 
dispute had failed, and that South Africa had intervened to protect certain interests such 
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as the Katse Dam water scheme. In addition, the Lesotho government was democratically 
elected, despite certain irregularities during the election process and that it was 
increasingly required of South Africa to play a role in regional peacekeeping efforts. 
Furthermore, it was stated that the decision had notified ambitions elements in the 
military forces in the region that in no member state would the political aspirations of any 
military faction be tolerated, and that South Africa’s commitment to the development of 
the region.84
 
From South Africa’s point of view, it was not just a simple and insignificant operation in 
a small neighbouring state, it was a dramatic event and a milestone for the new South 
Africa. It was the first time that the post apartheid government ever deployed troops on 
foreign soil in a conflict situation. By doing so it changed its relationship with Lesotho 
and the region. However, South African troops were expecting no resistance as a results 
they were lightly armed and arrived handing out leaflets, which said they had come to 
prevent anarchy and to help restore order. Those expectations proved wrong as they met 
armed resistance from elements of Lesotho army and order collapsed in the main towns, 
as mobs looted and burnt shops and offices. The violence and infighting claimed more 
than 100 soldiers and civilians were killed including eight South African troops. Pretoria 
responded by sending reinforcements with heavier arms. Eventually up to 4,000 South 
African troops were deployed and they soon restored order. A political settlement 
followed whereby an interim political authority was installed to oversee affairs until the 
elections were held within 15 to 18 months. South Africa troops remained in 
Mountainous Kingdom until the end of 1998. 85
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4.6 Media reaction  
 
The other important point is the fact that the operation was conducted in the full glare of 
the media. The result of the operation was described in journalistic terms as a loss of 
innocence as it announced the arrival of different South Africa. Moreover, a heated 
debate had been heard eliciting a variety of viewpoints from reporters, analysts and 
government spokesperson on the appropriateness of SADC’S intervention in Lesotho. 
As far as media reports were concerned, the intervention operation in Lesotho became 
South Africa’s school of hand knocks, especially in light of the higher than expected rate 
of casualties. Newspaper headlines referred to Operation Boleas as ‘the incursion that 
went wrong’, ‘fearful milestone for South Africa’, ‘South Africans botch military 
intervention in Lesotho’, ‘South African peace efforts look more like war’ and ‘SANDF 
blunder’. Moreover, as arson and looting in Maseru resulted in several deaths, the effect 
of the operation was described as a city mined by bungled intervention. The reports 
reflected and typified the general attitude of a large part of the media. These are some of 
the reports made by political commentators: 
‘Their peacekeeping operation in shambles, South African military leaders gave their 
troops shoot-to-kill orders yesterday to suppress mutineers in Lesotho, where looters and 
arsonists rampaged through the capital’.86  
 
‘They achieved the exact opposite. Moving in against fierce resistance, with poor 
information from their intelligence apparatus, they failed to secure their objectives 
timeously, and stood by while the Basotho basically looted and burnt down their own 
capital. The major causes of this failure were due to a lack of intelligence as the situation 
on the ground, and the fact that they were understrength militarily for an operation of this 
nature’.87
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Dr Theo Neethling in his article ‘ Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on 
Operation Boleas and Beyond’ quotes some of the reports reflecting general bias on the 
side of the media: 
‘Burning and smoldering buildings, indiscriminate and unchecked arson and looting. At 
least 66 people killed. A once thriving city practically destroyed. These were costs of this 
week’s SA-led peace keeping mission to Lesotho following almost two months of 
protests by opposition parties against the results of the mountain kingdom’s May 
elections. During those weeks, the opposition loudly proclaims only five people were 
killed and not a single window was broken. Anyone present in Lesotho this week would 
have found it difficult to argue with that point of view. The situation was rich in irony, 
however well intentioned and legally correct Tuesday’s dawn incursion by 600 SANDF 
troops may have been. Its legal correctness is under dispute, as is the motive behind what 
is variously described as an invasion, incursion or intervention depending upon to whom 
one speaks,’ and ‘Apartheid South Africa had a history of being cruel and arrogant 
towards Lesotho that very few people outside Lesotho ever heard of…They (our 
neighbours) maintain that the new South Africa is a very bit arrogant towards them as the 
old South Africa was…The real damage has been done at home. Mistakes that cost 
money can be explained away. Mistakes that send boys in body bags demand straight 
answers. We need some assurance that they will not happen again.’  
  
The SANDF was also heavily criticised for what was perceived as severely 
underestimating its task against mutinous LDF. One reporter potrayed the general outlook 
as follows. ‘The South African forces were also dangerously understrength, more than 
likely because of poor intelligence about the level of resistance anticipated, and entered 
the country prepared for a best-case rather than a worst-case scenario. So instead of 
securing the capital and preserving peace and stability, as was the mission’s intention. 
SANDF troops became tied up in a protracted battle with mutineers, giving opposition 
supporters the opportunity to plunder, loot and burn the city center.’ Another reporter 
presented the following view; 
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‘Before entering Lesotho, South Africa should have rattled more sabres and if then 
decided that intervention was unavoidable, it should have gone in with enough force to 
keep casualties to a minimum and prevent the widespread rioting that destroyed the 
Maseru city centre. Militarily, the operation was bungled due to poor intelligence about 
likely level of resistance, inexperience and a lack of co-ordination with the Botswana 
forces which arrived a day later’. 
 
In its media statement, the South African Council of Churches (SACC) expressed deep 
dismay over South African military intervention. in Lesotho. SACC said such act ca not 
contribute towards a peaceful settlement of deep divisions within that nation. They 
further said the act denied the basic premise upon which our own democratic nation was 
founded, the principle of negotiated settlement and peaceful resolution of differences by 
the parties concerned without any dominating intrusion outside forces. The act denied the 
independent statehood of Lesotho and constituted an invasion of that nation on the part of 
South Africa. (SACC Media Statement: 22 September 1998)   
 
4.7 Government response 
 
It became clear that the media played a pivotal role in interpreting news and events in 
respect of Operation Boleas. Then the tag of war began as predicted between government 
spokespersons and media in trying to respond to the aforementioned reports. The media 
establishment was challenged for its perceived inaccurate or biased reporting on the 
operation. A legal advisor in the office of president in South Africa, Fink Haysom blamed 
the media for its blindness to the values and sacrifices behind the Lesotho intervention as 
a result of an unprofessional rush to fashionable and superficial judgement. Furthermore, 
the late presidential spokesperson Parks Mankahlana, publicly claimed the following: 
“The candidness of our government does not deserve to be rewarded with verbal abuse 
and disingenuous disregard for facts as we saw…neither should it legitimize sloppy 
comment and lackadaisical appraisal of what we believe most South Africans regard to 
be serious national and international developments. Perceived executive errors do not 
give licence to the prostitution of the truth or the manipulation of fears of an impending 
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apocalypse or even conventional stereotypes about government on the African continent 
as understood by cynics and detractors of both our government and everything that is 
African. We all depend on them (the media) to know what is happening in the country 
and the world. There is therefore an obligation on the part of the media not only to report 
accurately, but to offer informed comment as well. True, the media has an entertainment 
role, but entertainment of the opponents of the government cannot happen at the expense 
of decent comment.”88
 
Former President Nelson Mandela also defended South Africa’s military intervention in 
Lesotho. He said it was necessary to restore stability to the Kingdom, which has been 
gripped by unrest since general elections in May-elections, which the opposition said, 
were rigged. He said that to ensure peace and stability, the Basotho [the people of 
Lesotho] themselves can sit down and explore a political solution.  
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe also supported Mandela as they were all part of 
the troika agreement (BBC News: 24 September 1998).  On the other hand the opposition 
spokesperson of BNP said against a background of gunfire, the intervention would be 
unpopular with the majority of the population. She further stated that Mandela sent troops 
to butcher Basotho people. She further that the intervention was a reversal of South 
African foreign policy. Mandela refused to send troops to the Congo to prop up the 
regime of Laurent Kabila. She argued that there are no other SADC troops that have 
taken part in the operation apart from 300 Botswana who joined the South African troops 
(Talbot: 1998: 2).   
 
The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad made his statement in parliament on 
3 November to justify the intervention. Pahad said on 22 September 1998, Acting 
President Buthelezi informed Parliament about the SADC intervention in Lesotho. He 
admitted that from some sectors of the opposition and media there was a barrage of 
criticism. He said that was understandable because the individuals and media were 
responding from ignorance, lack of information or simply political opportunism. He also 
                                                          
88 Neethling, T. 1999 Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas and Beyond. The 
Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. [Online] Available from www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr.  
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denied the allegations that the SANDF had embarked on an orgy of rape, murder and 
looting and the prediction of long drawn-out guerilla warfare and the destruction of all 
possibilities of finding a political solution. He then praised South African intervention by 
saying, “I am happy to inform the Parliament that within weeks of SADC intervention 
and despite the prophets of doom and gloom, the Lesotho Parliament has passed the 
Interim Political Authority Bill. In terms of this Bill an Interim Authority, composed of 
two members each of the twelve political parties will be established to prepare for the 
holding of general elections within a period of eighteen months. Its mandate will be to 
review the electoral code and promote conditions conducive for holding free and fair 
elections and the levelling of the playing fields for all political parties and candidates. 
This Bill is a triumph for stability and democracy and it confirmed our view that unless 
the coup in Lesotho was ended and the security situation normalised, it would be 
impossible to deal with the political problems. In welcoming this development we must 
express our congratulations to the Lesotho Government and opposition parties. We must 
also acknowledge the important role played by the SADC facilitating team led by 
Minister Mufumadi and the invaluable role of the SADC interventionist forces” (The 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 3 November 1998).  
 
 
4.8 Was Operation Boleas a legal intervention? 
 
There has been much confusion within the South African government, SADC and among 
many political commentators about the South African and Botswana government’s legal 
mandate to intervene in Lesotho. Some analysts argued that it was not legal whereas the 
others argued that it was legal.  In his article Southall, argues that the intervention does 
not seem to have been founded on sound international legal ground. South Africa/SADC 
cannot be faulted for helping a legitimate government recently elected, which requested 
assistance. However, this does not have sufficient grounds to validate a military 
intervention. On the other hand SADC’s argument is based on two principles. First, the 
South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe guarantee of Lesotho’s stability forged in 1994. 
Second, SADC’S own inter-state security arrangements particularly Article 5 of the 
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protocol on politics, defence and security. This protocol permits intervention where there 
is a large scale evidence between sections of the population or between armed or 
paramilitary forces and sections of the population, if the legitimate authority of the 
government, or if any crisis could threaten the peace and security of other states. 
However, neither of these instruments was formally ratified.89
 
One of the greatest difficulties pertaining to Operation Boleas was clearly its political 
justification from regional perspective. Much confusion surrounded the modalities for 
security co-operation under the auspices of SADC. SADC became the focus of 
international attention when Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia decided to take part in an 
intervention operation in DRC on August 1998. This decision was based on the requests 
made by the late President Laurent Kabila for military assistance after DRC joined SADC 
in 1997. South Africa specifically emphasised the need for a peaceful solution and 
declined to send troops. The South African decision eventually proved to be wise, since 
Rwanda and Uganda decided to engage in the conflict in support of the rebel movement, 
while Chad and Sudan were subsequently in to fight on the side of Kabila.90
 
On 31 August, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for a cease-fire in the 
DRC, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and opening of political dialogue towards 
national reconciliation. The statement also repeated an earlier call for an international 
conference on peace, security and development in the region, to hold under the auspices 
of the UN and the OAU. However, on 13 and 14 September 1998 at the 18th SADC 
Summit held in Mauritius the SADC Heads of State and Government welcomed the 
initiatives by SADC and its member states intended to assist in the restoration of peace, 
security and stability in the DRC. 
 
In September 1998, shortly after Kabila’s request for assistance, South Africa and 
Botswana intervened in Lesotho in trying to assist the Lesotho government in restoring 
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 62
law and order following the election-related unrest. The undertaking was labelled as a 
SADC force in name after a series of phone calls between the relevant heads of state. The 
intervention was immediately questioned as some observers claimed that the operation 
went beyond existence in international law as only the point that South Africa had 
intervened to protect certain South African interests, such as Katse dam would seem to 
have clear existence in international law. It was also specifically pointed out that there 
were no clear guidelines on the part of SADC regarding military responses to internal 
conflicts in SADC member countries.91
  
South African Acting President at that time Mangosuthu Buthelezi said the political 
mandate of the SANDF and BDF was to restore stability in Lesotho. The mandate had 
three components, to restore order in security establishment, to secure the Katse dam and 
clear protesters from the Royal Palace, but the Operation Boleas confiscated the entire 
LDF armouny, thus literally disbanding the Lesotho army. It is this reason that many 
commentators argued that in doing so South African government has exceeded its 
mandate and was threatening the sovereignty of Lesotho. 
 
Article 2.4 of the UN Charter stipulates that member states of the United Nations may not 
use or threaten force against another member states. However, there are three exceptions 
to this rule in the UN Charter. First, article 51 of the UN Charter provides for the right to 
self-defence only against an armed attack, not a coup or an act of force short of an armed 
attack. Second, the UN Security Council may authorise use of force and the third 
exception is that it may authorise a regional organisation to use force.92 Unfortunately 
none of these three exceptions applied in the case of Lesotho. The legal debate around the 
question of whether the intervention was use of force against a state or something less 
than the use of force as defined in international law. South African government 
responded to a call by the Lesotho government to intervene in the country legitimises the 
action. Although they disagree with the manner in which South Africa intervened in 
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Lesotho, it is undeniable that Lesotho citizens were looking to the outside world for help 
at the time.93   
 
There are various reasons that necessitated South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho. First, 
the 1994 SADC Memorandum of Understanding in terms of which the democratically-
elected government of Prime Minister Mokhehle was reinstated after the 17 August 1994 
royal coup by King Letsie III. Under this agreement, South Africa, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe became guarantors of democracy, peace and stability in Lesotho. Second, the 
Kingdom of Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, on which it is entirely 
dependent economically. Third, as chairperson of SADC, South Africa was obliged to 
uphold the organisation’s principles, particularly those calling for securing human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. Finally, some analysts claim that national interests in 
Lesotho, in the form of the Highlands Water Project also drove South Africa. South 
Africa has invested billions of rands in this project, and political or a military coup would 
have jeopardised the flow of water to Gauteng, the economic heartland of South Africa.94
 
4.9 South African foreign policy towards Lesotho crisis 
 
The intervention was handled in a way that made post-apartheid South Africa appear 
little better than its apartheid predecessor. South Africa’s perceived new economic 
hegemony had already invited a growing resentment throughout the region. Now there 
was a danger that South Africa will be seen to be throwing its military weight around. 
The intervention also showed an inconsistency in South Africa’s apartheid policy. It was 
promoted as a programme based on principle rather than pragmatism with human rights 
and peace making at the front. When South Africa protested the extension of military 
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support by other SADC countries to the dubiously democratic regime of Kabila in the DR 
Congo. It earned praise on moral and logical grounds. In contrast the armed intervention 
to impose a political solution in Lesotho has rightly aroused concern.95  
 
Southall further argues that Lesotho intervention was a typical case where countries used 
the pretext of international organisations to further their own interests. South Africa’s 
intervention in Lesotho was viewed as a response to the power politics being played out 
between Presidents Mugabe, chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security and Mandela, chairperson of SADC. This tension stemmed partly from 
Zimbabwe’s view that South Africa was becoming a threat to its political stance in the 
region since it joined SADC in 1992. This resulted in a tussle at the SADC level between 
Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe over the leadership of SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security and its relationship with the entire SADC structure. Lesotho case 
was seen as a victim of the tussle between two hegemonic forces in Southern Africa.96
 
It is also argued that South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho represented a paradigm 
change from Mandela to the Mbeki era. The negotiated and political solution to the DRC 
crisis advocated by President Mandela differed greatly from the military response to the 
Lesotho crisis, managed mainly by the office of the  deputy president. Furthermore, it was 
before 1999, where Mbeki was to take over and was expected to have gained necessary 
experience to implement new people-centred security concerns in the Southern African 
region, which are reflected in most South African policy documents on peace operations, 
arms trade and regional security. It also claimed that the intervention was driven more by 
material interest than political and humanitarian imperatives. When the South African 
government declared that it would not send military reinforcements to the Kabila 
government along with Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia, it claimed that its position was 
based on principle. When it went into Lesotho with Botswana it also claimed that its 
decision was based on principle. The principle appear to contradict each other, indicating 
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that its benefit was rather based on pragmatic cost benefit considerations in addition o 
strategic and economic interest calculations.97
 
The intervention also led to the question of who was in charge of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. Numerous critics pointed out that neither Mandela nor Mbeki were in the country 
at the time. However, Acting President Mangosuthu Buthelezi consulted both Mandela 
and Mbeki before sending South African troops to Lesotho. The role if any played by the 
department of foreign affairs remained unclear, beyond post-justification by Deputy 
Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad. He stated that Botswana, Zimbabwe and South Africa were 
mandated to act on behalf of SADC to restore the democratically elected government. 
After intensive negotiations and threat of military intervention by SADC forces, the 
democratically elected government was restored to power and soldiers returned to their 
barracks.98
 
4.10 Lessons Learnt 
 
There are number of lessons that have been drawn during Lesotho military intervention. 
South Africa learned on a very hard way in Lesotho and had to change the way it 
engaged itself in other African countries including Burundi. First, Pretoria promoted the 
diplomatic engagements in resolving conflicts than military intervention. This was caused 
by the fact that the military intervention in Lesotho was strongly condemned because it 
led to a number of casualties. Second, the intelligence was blamed in Lesotho for 
underestimating the extent of the crisis, which resulted into violence, and looting. The 
commander of the operation Colonel Robbie Hartsfield even conceded that he had led the 
troops into Lesotho on the basis of poor or even false information. He further 
acknowledged that they had inadequate knowledge of the political situation, of the 
strength and disposition of the Lesotho troops, and the Lesotho people. They crossed the 
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borders believing that the vast majority of the population would welcome them and that 
there would be little or no resistance from Lesotho forces.  
 
Due to what happened in Lesotho, a number of lessons were learnt from the Operation 
Boleas could improve the performance of the SANDF and also other Southern African 
forces in future operations. These lessons include the following: First, the parameters of 
possible future intervention operations needed to be clarified in terms of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. Second, the degree of resistance of armed soldiers, in particular those who 
are not commanded by a formal structure should never be underestimated. Third, 
intervention operations should be conducted with an outlook approach of expecting the 
worst under hostile conditions and should move on a continuum from enforcement action 
towards a peacekeeping role. Fourth, planning for future intervention operations needs to 
address all foreseeable contingencies and successful operation is possible only when an 
appropriate plan exists, covering all possible aspects of the anticipated action and 
response. In the event where no contingency plan exists, enough time must be allowed for 
the full spectrum of deployment drills. Fifth, military staff who understands intervention 
operations or rapid deployment under hostile circumstances needs to be in control. Sixth, 
the challenge of interoperability and the deployment of the SANDF in a combined or 
regional force need to receive continuous attention at all relevant levels. Seventh, military 
intelligence resources should be deployed prior to intervention to provide real time and 
timely intelligence during execution and the personnel should be trained and skilled to 
execute their functions under hostile conditions. Eighth, communication with the media 
and other relevant role players such as local population is a critical factor if intervention 
operations are to be successfully conducted. Ninth, mandate for intervention operations 
should provide for all possible collateral incidents, such as looting and arson and the 
necessary powers for example powers of arrest to deal with such incidents should be 
provided. Last, the entrance into an area of conflict should be preceded by a sound 
assessment of the situation. All the decision-makers must be provided with a thorough 
evaluation of the nature of conflict, prospects for a political solution to the conflict, the 
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extent to which military intervention will facilitate conflict resolution and the political 
objectives of the intervention.99  
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
In assessing these events in Lesotho, it has been concluded that increasing poverty and 
economic dependence on South Africa has compounded these struggles. These struggles 
have led to severe competition for access to state resources, particularly ministerial and 
senior management positions in government, parastatal, army and other institutions. The 
result has been interminable challenges to the legitimacy of the government in Lesotho. It 
is this reason that Mathoma (1999) argues that every time a faction of the political elite 
has lost the election in the past it would claim that the election was rigged and then call 
for the monarchy and the military, which would become immediate allies in its attempt to 
win what it could not in the election as this was the case in 1965, 1970, 1990, 1993 and 
1998. It was no surprise therefore that the 1998 political crisis in Lesotho sparked off by 
the opposition alliance’s challenge to the legitimacy of the 1998 elections 
 
This chapter has critically analysed the perspectives, views and lessons learnt during 
Lesotho intervention. It has clearly discussed how South Africa was criticised by political 
analysts and media for its foreign policy decision making to intervene in Lesotho conflict. 
Some of the reasons for its criticism were the understrength military and poor intelligence 
that led to a number of casualties. Second, the damage caused by the intervention was 
enormous and it took some years to make recovery. It was also recommended that South 
Africa should become involved in traditional peace keeping operations in Africa, rather 
than peace enforcement operations. Third, a structure needed to be established at SADC 
level to decide on the form and mandate of peacekeeping operations in the region. South 
Africa has also learned some lessons in dealing with the issue of Lesotho. First, South 
Africa’s foreign policy principles proved to be ambiguous, and/or to clash with other 
principles and interest. For example the sovereignty was an issue in the Lesotho case, 
where principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another state clashed with the 
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principle of upholding democracy. Further, while Pretoria claimed it was intervening in 
Lesotho under SADC’s banner, critics accused it of pursuing its ambition to absorb 
Lesotho and to protect its interests and investments there. Second, the military 
intervention in Lesotho also revealed internal differences within the foreign policy 
makers. At the time of the intervention a draft white paper on South Africa’s contribution 
to international peace mission was in its final stages of wide ranging discussion within 
the government. The paper recommended a diplomatic approach, with the emphasis on 
peace making and keeping, rather than peace enforcements by military means. Yet, 
Lesotho was an example of the latter. Third, the case of Lesotho further obliged the 
government to recognise that its self-perception and its espoused values were not 
necessarily shared by others. In South Africa’s view it had acted benignly to preserve 
Lesotho’s democracy and a legitimate government within the terms of SADC remit, and 
the request of the legitimate government. However, the critics inside and outside Lesotho, 
who accused Pretoria of harbouring and bullying hegemonic ambitions, challenged the 
perception. Last, the South African government failed to appreciate the importance of 
sound intelligence and planning prior the action. This followed the campaign Lieutenant 
General Deon Ferreira claimed that the intervention had been badly planned and initially 
inadequately equipped and armed. After these challenges and recommendations on South 
Africa’s foreign policy with regard to conflict resolution in Africa, Pretoria seemed to 
have learnt some lessons in Lesotho crises. It should also be borne in mind that it was 
Pretoria’s first peace operations after the apartheid government. It is this reason that the 
next chapter will look at the Burundi conflict to appraise South Africa’s conduct in 
Bujumbura’s conflict.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5. SOUTH AFRICA’S MEDIATION EFFORTS IN BURUNDI 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was strongly criticised by a number of 
commentators and analysts. Through this experience South Africa learned some lessons 
in a very hard way. It is argued that the South Africa’s foreign policy also shifted and 
South Africa engaged itself more on constructive engagement with contrast to the peace 
enforcements. Drawing from the lessons and experience from Lesotho that has been 
discussed in the previous chapter, it was clear that South Africa had to use another 
strategy when dealing with other conflicts in Africa to avoid the mistakes that occurred in 
Maseru. This chapter examines how Pretoria conducted itself during mediation efforts in 
Bujumbura by making a comparative analysis with Lesotho. 
 
5.2 Political and economic overview of Burundi   
 
Like Lesotho, the Republic of Burundi is a land-locked country lying on the Eastern 
Shore of Lake Tanganyika in Central Africa, a little south of Equator. Rwanda borders it 
to the north, by Tanzania to the south and east, and by the Democratic Republic of Congo 
to the west. The climate is hot and humid in the low lands and cool in the highlands with 
an irregular rainfall. The population is composed of three ethnic groups: the Hutu 85%, 
the Tutsi 14% and the Twa 1%. The official languages are French and Kirundi, while 
Swahili is used in addition to French in commercial circles. More than 65% of 
Burundians are Christians and being Roman Catholics. Large minority still adheres to 
traditional animist beliefs. The national flag consists of a white diagonal cross on a 
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background of red (above and below) and green (hoist and fly) with a white circle, 
containing three green-edged red stars in the center. The capital town is Bujumbura. 100
Burundi is a resource-poor country with an underdeveloped manufacturing sector. The 
economy is mainly agricultural, with roughly 90% of the population dependent on 
subsistence agriculture. Its economic health depends on the coffee crop, which accounts 
for 50% of exports and 80% of foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, the ability to pay 
for imports rests largely on the climate and the international coffee market. A 
combination of flood and insect infestation led to severe drop in coffee production in 
2003, which resulted in approximately a 20% loss of revenues from those of the previous 
year. In 2002, food accounted for 9.4% of imports. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) reported that the number of households receiving agricultural 
assistance had risen from 103,300 in 1999 to 210,000 in 2004 and would probably reach 
250,000 in the near term. Burundi’s high transport costs and distance from the sea weigh 
down industrial development. As has been the case with Lesotho, Burundi’s economy has 
been strongly affected by conflict. The economy has been stagnant over the past few 
years because of the ongoing violence.101
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Table 5.1: BURUNDI: Basic indicators 
Population (2003) 6.1 million 
Birth rate (2003) (per 1,000 population) 39.7 
Death rate (2003) (per 1,000 population) 17.8 
HIV/Aids infection rate (2001) (% of adult 
population) 
8.3 
GDP (2002) (billion) $3.8 
GDP per person (2002) $600 
Real annual GDP growth rate (2002) (%) 2.1 
Health expenditure (2000) (% of GDP) 3.2 
HDI ranking (2003) 171 out of 177 
 
Sources: CIA World Fact Book 2003, World Bank, World Development Indicators 
2003;and UN Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2003. 
 
5.3 Background to the conflict 
 
The modern day political instability can be traced back to 1993 when a democratically 
elected President Melchior Ndadaye who was a Hutu and six other senior government 
officials from Front For Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) were assassinated during an 
attempted coup conducted by the military. This sparked tension within the country, which 
led to mass killings of population from both sides of the societal divide. These years of 
armed conflict have turned Burundi into an open theatre for the illicit arms trade, whose 
lethality has made almost every citizen a victim. In the aftermath of the death of Ndadaye 
fighting, mainly between Hutu rebels and the military, which were dominated by Tutsis, 
caused many deaths and rendered large areas of the country unsafe. Although, Hutus are 
demographically dominant, but often see themselves as vulnerable to the political and 
military power of the Tutsis. On the other hand, many Tutsis consider themselves part of 
a threatened minority. The ethnic strife has made all Burundians a target for violence, 
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with many fleeing to avoid fighting. These internally displaced persons are frequently 
viewed as dangerous by opposing group.102
 
 However, as is case with Lesotho, the deeper roots of Burundi’s crises lie in divisions, 
which pre-date the colonial period and which, were exacerbated under colonialism. In 
addition, the shape of contemporary politics owes much to a counter-revolutionary 
reaction to events that took place in neighbouring Rwanda at independence in 1962. 
Sporadic social conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis of Burundi started way back in 
1962 and intensified in 1972, 1988 and 1993. These resulted in the formation of Hutu 
militia groups such as Palipehutu-FNL, The National Liberation Front (FROLINA), and 
Consiel National pour La defense de la democratie-Forces pour la defense de la 
democratie (CNDD-FDD).103 In previous years the government had been dominated by 
Tutsis who are not even half of the Hutus. Some other leaders of Hutus were also 
assassinated and were never allowed to participate in government. The military force and 
other strategic positions have been dominated by Tutsis. On 6 April 1994 Ndadaye’s 
successor to the presidency, Cyprien Ntaryamira was killed when the plane he was 
travelling in with the Rwandan President Habyarimana, crashed after being hit by the 
rocket attack while approaching Kigali airport on 6 April 1994. The perpetrators of the 
attack were unknown, but their actions precipitated an agony of violence in Rwanda 
which made previous massacres in the Great Lakes pale into significance.  In accordance 
with the constitution, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was named interim president. Although 
Burundi’s politics is so often reduced in analytical shorthand to being centred on 
ethnicity is far from absolute. However, one can not overlook the issue of ethnicity, as 
there is still the importance of Hutu-ness or Tutsi-ness. The colonial and post-colonial 
political economy upon Burundi’s socio-democratic composition, had encouraged the 
ethnicity as a form of political identification rather than more unambiguously promoting 
an overarching sense of national identity and shared citizenship. 104
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During the first half of 1994 ethnic tensions increased as the armed extremist factions 
within Hutu and Tutsi communities attempted to establish territorial strongholds within 
the country. Violence continued to escalate throughout 1996, which led to successful 
bloodless coup that saw Pierre Buyoya reinstated as the interim president of a new 
transitional republic. In contrast, the Lesotho crisis was less devastating compared to the 
Burundi conflict. In Burundi, the civil claimed about 300 000 lives whereas in Lesotho 
the figure is far less than that. In March 1998 the government initiated negotiations with 
the national assembly that saw the national assembly and the government enter into 
partnership agreement that led to the adoption of a Transitional Constitutional Act, 
opening the door to political negotiations. A number of African statesmen have 
spearheaded mediation efforts to end the Burundi conflicts. The first facilitator was the 
former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere until his last days, followed by Nelson 
Mandela, the former South African president, and former South African deputy president, 
Jacob Zuma.105
 
5.4 Mandela’s mediation role  
 
After Nyerere’s death South Africa played a significant role in trying to resolve the 
conflict. Unlike in Lesotho, South Africa intervention was hijacked when Former 
President Nelson Mandela was chosen by the Great Lakes region leaders to replace the 
late Tanzanian leader Nyerere. It should be noted that at first South Africa did not have 
plans or rather immediate interest to voluntary take part in the conflict as it was the case 
with Lesotho, but because of Mandela’s stature he was asked to play a leading role in 
bringing about peace and stability in the country.  Mandela acted as chief mediator on 
behalf of South Africa. In choosing Mandela to replace Nyerere, regional leaders hoped 
to reestablish the broad-based international attention to Burundi that had faded during the 
interminable debates about sanctions and the standing of Nyerere’s mediation. At the 
same time, Mandela had sufficient regional legitimacy and leverage to sustain the 
continuity of an African process. Mandela’s regional anchor was critical from outset in 
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light of the Burundian government’s bid for South African mediation as means to 
circumvent the region, particularly Tanzania. Mandela’s mediation was an opportunity 
for external actors to assert more control over the mediation since previously the 
international community unquestioningly allowed Nyerere to handle the Burundi peace 
process and disregarded the Burundi government’s reservations toward him.  
 
In January 2000 negotiations resumed and Mandela chaired those negotiations. From the 
beginning, Mandela signaled a departure from Nyerere on the CNDD-FDD participation 
in the negotiations: “We cannot sideline anybody who can create instability in the 
country and so we must find ways of accommodating them in these discussions either by 
inviting them to join or addressing them separately. The process must be all-inclusive, 
otherwise there can be no guarantee that the armed groups on the ground, even if it is 
unanimous, will respect the decision of 18 parties. Please join the modern world. Why do 
you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without vision? 
Why are you lagging behind? When people in the West hear about the daily killings and 
massacres they say “Africans are still barbarians, no human being could do what they are 
doing. The fact that women, children and the aged are being slaughtered every day is an 
indictment against all of you”.106  
 
Mandela emphasised the issues of inclusiveness, trust and forgiveness and suggested 
ways to overcome some of the stumbling blocks in the negotiations. First, amnesty was 
key to security. Second, Hutu rebel fighters should be integrated into the army. Third, 
elections should not be held until everything has been discussed and settled in Arusha. 
Fourth, a transitional regime should not remain in place for more than five years. Lastly, 
property rights of returning refugees must be seriously considered. Mandela also used 
international prestige to refocus the attention to Burundi, mobilising international 
pressure to lend added weight on his efforts. As a result, on 19 January 2000, the UN, 
Security Council held a special meeting on Burundi that affirmed its determination to 
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support the Arusha peace process and underlined its concern about the worsening 
situation in Burundi. The Security Council went on to pass a resolution that endorsed 
Mandela’s role, condemned violence and called on the international community to 
provide increased assistance to peace process. 107   
 
He criticised Tutsi domination of public office and urged equal representation of Hutu 
and Tutsi armed forces, while denouncing Hutu rebel attacks on civilians. In April 2000 
Mandela visited Burundi for the first time where he met government and militia leaders. 
When he came back to Johannesburg, Mandela announced that Burundian president 
agreed to ensure equal representation of Hutu and Tutsi. In July 2000 Ndayikengurukiye 
a leader of the CNDD-FDD accepted invitation to participate in the peace negotiations 
 
 Salter (2002) argues that Mandela’s major contribution in Burundi’s peace process was 
the signing of Arusha peace Accord in August 2000. This paved way for transitional 
government, the formation of other committees, power sharing where Hutus were to be 
represented by 60% and Tutsis by 40% in the national government and the committees 
responsible for DDR process. The Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation was a 
partial agreement designed to lock the sides into a framework from which real peace 
could gradually grow. Power sharing, integration of army, and transitional government 
for three years were the key issues in the peace accord. The transitional government was 
to be responsible for overseeing judicial and institutional reforms to bring about ethnic 
balance. The constitution would be sent to a referendum before holding general elections. 
Contrary to Lesotho, the Burundian government was faced with a challenge of de-
mobilization, disarmament and re-integration (DDR). This meant that government had to 
bring the parties who were on conflict and the leaders who were in exile to take their 
ministerial positions. Secondly, the refugees had to come back and re-allocated to their 
villages where their safety would be guaranteed. The disarmament of rebels and re-
integration of army dominated by Tutsis and ensure that the former cadres are part of the 
army. Transformation of the role of army, where it had to protect the citizens rather than 
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oppressing them.  This conflict had already claimed more than 300, 000 deaths. However, 
two rebel groups refused to sign the agreement. These were The Counseil National pour 
La Defense De La Democratic forces (CNDD FDD) and the Forces Nationale de 
liberation (FNL). Political instability prevailed throughout 2002 and it was not good for 
the majority of Burundians, whom more than 70% live below the poverty line. The army 
was successful as there were few incidents involving South African army and Burundian 
people.108
 
After the signings of Arusha Agreement Mandela continued to use the mixture of moral 
pressure, regional and international influence to negotiate transitional institutions and a 
cease-fire. An important institution created by the Arusha agreement is the International 
Monitoring Committee (IMC). Since its creation in November 2000 the IMC has helped 
establish commissions on political prisoners, refugee repatriation and reintegration and 
launched sensitisation campaigns to publicise peace accord. In conjunction to IMC’s role, 
Mandela led negotiations for transitional institutions. After six months of fruitless talks 
on transitional arrangements, at regional summit of heads of state in February 2001, 
Mandela proposed a compromise that involved the three-year transition: a Tutsi president 
and Hutu vice president in the first half, followed by a Hutu president and Hutu vice 
president in the second half. However, there were deadlocks among parties for the 
candidates for these positions, and Mandela announced a compromise in July 2001 that 
retained Pierre Buyoya as president and a Hutu, Domitien Ndayizeye. As a consequence 
for this position, Mandela imposed 11 conditions on Buyoya: 
♦ Implement all provisions of a peace agreement; 
♦ Include representatives of all the signatory parties in the transitional government; 
♦ Invite the international community and the region to provide troops and peacekeepers 
to strengthen security and protect the political leaders returning from exile; 
♦ Reform the Tutsi-dominated army by integrating armed groups and Hutus into it; 
♦ Co-operate fully with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the return of 
refugees to Burundi and the resettlement of internally displaced persons; 
♦ Offer full protection to all political leaders, especially those returning from exile; 
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♦ Refrain from victimising political opponents; 
♦ Release all political prisoners; 
♦ Co-operate fully with IMC; 
♦ Promptly vacate office at the end of the 18-month; and  
♦ Make these commitments before a regional summit. 
 
In July, Buyoya accepted these conditions before regional leaders who threatened 
sanctions if he violated them. When the Burundian parties were are unable to set up a 
special army unit of Tutsis and Hutus to protect returning exiled leaders, Mandela 
prevailed on the South African government to provide a 700-man force. The troops were 
drawn from a number of SANDF units, and included paratroopers from the 44th 
Parachute Brigade; medical orderliness from the SA Military Health Service; VIP 
protection units from SA Air Force; and signalers from Wonderboom Military Base. 
Headquarters personnel was made up of troops from the 43rd SA Brigade. The South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF) contingent was mandated to protect about 150 
Burundian political leaders, who have returned from exile to participate in the country’s 
power-sharing transitional government, which was installed on 1 November 2001. This 
was later followed by peacekeeping troops from Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. This last 
agreement, reached at a regional summit in Pretoria in October 2001, paved the way for 
the inauguration of the transitional government on November 2001. Overshadowing the 
marked progress on transitional institutions was inability of the regional and international 
actors to reach cease-fire between the government and the rebels. Cease-fire negotiations 
that began in January 2001 have dragged on inconclusively in South Africa, the DRC, 
and Gabon.  Mandela handed over to Zuma to play a leading role after the Arusha 
agreement was signed. 109
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5.5 Zuma’s mediation efforts 
 
Apart from Nelson Mandela, former South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma also 
played a pivotal role on behalf of South African government in the mediation process 
throughout 2002. Mandela assisted by Zuma undertook several missions in a bid to 
induce the rebels stepped up their attacks within Burundi, briefly occupying parts of 
Bujumbura in 2001. During a meeting in Pretoria in July 2001, Mandela, Zuma and 
Gabon’s President Omar Bongo mediated the establishment of technical committees 
between the Burundi government and CNDD-FDD to cover the seize-fire.  
 
Zuma then replaced Mandela as a Chief Mediator. He hosted a new series of 
consultations between the militia groups and Burundi government. Some militia groups 
did not want to participate, opposing Zuma’s involvement in the cease-fire process. As it 
was also the case in Lesotho where other countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe 
were part of the mediation efforts, Tanzania, Uganda and Gabon also took part in the 
mediation process in Burundi. Towards the end of 2002, further conflict erupted where 
the government troops slaughtered more than 170 000 civilians. This interrupted the 
repatriation of civilians who were from neighbouring countries such as Tanzania that had 
about 345 000 from Burundi. Deputy president Zuma chaired a number of negotiations 
and some agreements were signed by major faction groups such as CNDD-FDD led by 
Jean Boco Ndayikengurukiye and FNL led by Alain Mugarabona signed cease fire 
agreement. On 3 December 2002, following mediation from Uganda and South Africa, 
the government finally reached cease-fire agreement on February 2003. The AU cease-
fire agreement observer mission comprising of 35 monitors from Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Togo and Tunisia to monitor the peace agreement. In April 2003 AU mission in Burundi 
(AMIB) arrived and comprised of troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique 
to assist in enforcement of cease-fire between government and rebel forces. On 8 October 
2003 after four days of peace discussions in Tshwane, South Africa under the mediation 
of Zuma and Thabo Mbeki, Ndayizaye signed an agreement with Nkurizinya on political, 
military and security power sharing.110
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5.6 Post conflict peace building initiatives 
 
The post conflict peace building is multifaceted and it is normally carried out under the 
auspices of the UN. The purpose is to prevent conflict from resurfacing. It also helps the 
countries to get back into normal life and move societies to sustainable peace. One of the 
key components of any peace building process is DDR, which D is Disarmament, D is 
Demobilisation and R means Reintegration. Disarmament involves the physical removal 
of weapons from combatants on all sides of the conflict. In Burundi the National 
Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR) manages the 
process and UN Operation in Burundi oversees the programme. The weapons are taken 
from the combatants because it is difficult to achieve a peace process in the presence of 
armed movements especially combatants.   Disarmament involves the dismantling of 
military units and transition of ex-combatants from military to civilian life. Reintegration 
issues in DDR involve security, reconciliation, human rights, police and judiciary 
reform.111
 
5.7 The DDR process  
 
The Lesotho conflict was different to the Burundi conflict, as it did not undergo the full 
Disarmament, Dimobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) process. It is precisely because 
the extent of conflict did not really require this process. However there was integration 
where the Lesotho army was reintegrated into one national army bringing together some 
of the militants that were opposed to government. With regard to disarmament, the UN 
Security Council authorised United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to use all 
necessary means to ensure respect for the cease-fire agreements through monitoring their 
implementation and investigating their violations, to carry out the disarmament and 
demobilisation activities of the national DDR programme combatants and to continue to 
monitor the illegal flow of arms across the national borders. As a way of enhancing 
efforts for a peaceful transition period, ONUB’s mandate includes the creation of security 
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conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and facilitating the voluntary 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons. It includes the contributing to the 
successful completion of the electoral process stipulated in the Arusha Agreement by 
ensuring a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections. It is always 
important to ensure that the disarmament process is successful so as to ensure that 
country does go back to the war.  
 
A progress has been made in as far as Burundi DDR programme is concerned. A 
multidimensional regional trust fund established by the World Bank estimated the cost of 
DDR programme in Burundi at US$80 million. Under this plan, the demobilised soldiers 
will receive salary for 18 months, payable in three tranches. The ex-soldiers may get less 
if their numbers surpass the estimates.112 After the designation of the pre-assembly areas, 
combatants will proceed to cantonment sites, to disarmament corridors and to integration 
and demobilisation areas.  During this entire process the government troops would return 
to their barracks, while their weapons are deposited armouries. Demobilisation for the 
new army would commence based on criteria designed by the parties to the Technical 
forces Agreement (TFA). Combatants who failed to meet the conditions for recruitment 
into the new security forces would be demobilised and handed to the National 
Commission for Demobilisation, Reinsertion and Reintegration (CNDRR). The NCDDR 
has been advanced in various ways. In April 2004 the World Bank donated US$33 
million Burundi toward the establishment of a project on demobilisation, reinsertion and 
reintegration. 
 
In order to accompany the demobilisation process and facilitate the transformation 
process of the ex-combatants, the National Programme on Demobilisation, Reinsertion 
and Reintegration  (NPDRR) was created. This programme is mandated to study lessons 
learnt from similar programmes in other countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, 
Chad, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Rwanda. The NPDRR has three main 
objectives. First, demobilisation of the military and the Armed Political Parties and 
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Movements (APPMs). Second, to facilitate the reinsertion of those mobilised into civilian 
life followed by socio-economic resources from the defence sector to the social and 
economic sectors. According to the NCDRR document detailing the commission’s basic 
conditions, the assistance programme will cover four stages, namely disarmament, 
demobilisation, reinsertion and reintegration. On disarmament, the document spells out 
that the responsibility for disarmament will reside with Joint Ceasefire Commission 
(JCC) and ONUB. On the disarmament, the document stipulates that the ex-combatants 
will either present themselves voluntarily or will be identified and taken to 
demobilisation centres where the arms will be recovered, registered, stocked and 
destroyed.  
 
The challenge to the Burundi DDR process has been the NCDRR procedure document 
which was general and non-conclusive on various issues such as women and child 
soldiers. It stated that the DDR programme would give women soldiers special attention 
related to their specific needs such as security (by housing separately from men in 
demobilisation centres) and hygiene, and offering them social-economic support that will 
allow them to reintegrate into society and the type, and amount of support accorded to 
women ex-combatants is not specified. With regard to child soldiers, the document stated 
that support to child soldiers will include family reunification with parents or guardians, 
social-psychological support to the traumatised, facilitation of access to education, and 
recreation in their communities of reintegration, while those over the age of 15 will be 
given professional training. Concerning the disarmament of the defence militia and armed 
civilians, the disarmament programme will target the government defence militia, 
gardiens de la paix (often composed of mainly youth militia), and civilians. For ordinary 
civilians in possession of arms, the transitional government intends to create a special 
fund that will support an arms collection programme that will encourage civilians to hand 
in their weapons. This was supposed to be a voluntary arrangement, where those who 
prefer to keep their arms would be obliged to obtain permits, so that the government is 
able to record and keep records of who possesses what types of weapons.  113    
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The DDR process in Burundi as proposed by the NCDDR, has been set to run for four 
years, with two objectives. First, the programme will focus mainly on demobilisation and 
integration. Second, it will gradually reduce its integration process to coincide with a 
time frame of four years. The reality is that the DDR process may take more than four 
years as human growth and development take time. Societies also do not heal 
immediately, hence the need to sustain the integration of the DDR programme for some 
time, or at least extend benefits to certain affected groups such as children. In 2004 a 
number of efforts to initiate the DDR process under ONUB. There were 11 pre-
cantonment centres around the country by June 2004. These centres are located in the 
militarised areas, with varying numbers of excombatants awaiting the beginning of the 
DDR process. 
 
Table 5.2: Centres and number of ex-combatants 
 
Centre Number of ex-combatants (approximate) 
Kibuye 7,000 
Ntamba 2,430 
Gashingwa 3,000 
Denga 321 
Bambo 687 
Kabumburi 251 
Makamba 210 
Kabonga 3,000 
Bukeye 3,000 
Karindo 6,000 
Muyange 150 
  
Source: ISS Paper No 97  
 
These reception centres spread across the country and contain mostly the former 
combatants signatory of the Arusha Agreement. Within the camps, ex-combatants were 
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grouped into 10-15 people to maintain order, especially when receiving food rations from 
the humanitarian agencies and other donors supporting the feeding programme. 114
 
There has been a progress in as far as disarmament and demobilisation is concerned in 
Burundi. According to spokesperson for the ONUB, Burundi has disarmed and 
demobilised 7,282 former combatants since December 2004 under the ongoing 
programme that included their reintegration into society. The figures state that 6,315 were 
men, 328 women and 639 children. The two disarmament centres in the west central 
province of Bubanza and another in the central province of Gitega had been emptied of 
ex-combatants. Some have integrated into the country’s security forces and others 
reintegrated into the civilian life.  Upon disarmament at pre-disarmament assembly 
centres, former combatants were sent to cantonment sites where under ONUB protection, 
they decided whether to rejoin civilian life or be integrated into either the army or the 
police. Those entering the army are sent to a harmonisation centre at Tenga north of the 
capital, Bujumbura, where they meet/ mix with other ex-combatants destined for the 
NDF. Those joining the police force are taken to police training centres. The DDR plan is 
scheduled to run for four years with formation of an initial 45,000-member National 
Defence Force, which would later be reduced to 30,000 and finally to 25,000 troops. On 
this DDR programme ONUB worked with the Joint Cease-fire Commission, the 
integrated Military Command and their joint liaison teams.115
 
5.8 Physical and political reconstruction 
 
Despite the fact that reconstruction is not an integral part of the DDR process, due to the 
nature of the conflict in Burundi there is a need for reconstruction as part of the post-
conflict building initiative. Arusha broadly defines reconstruction as the restoration of the 
living conditions of the population to their best previous level. This literally means the 
whole range of activities to be conducted in order to attain the highest, and hence the 
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most significant, socio-economic indicators in the past. Thereafter the term is divided into 
two separate aspectsphysical and political reconstruction. 
 
Physical reconstruction includes measures to facilitate the return of refugees and 
displaced people, and an inventory of infrastructure of key sectors such as health, 
housing, water and educational facilities. Arusha agreement stipulates that between 
150,000 to 200,000 houses must be rebuilt at an estimated cost of 25,000 Burundian 
Francs per house. The primary issue of land tenure and ownership should be addressed 
first before the houses can be rebuilt. The huge amount of resources needed to implement 
reconstruction can be gauged by the fact that the cost of one kilometre of water piping is 
estimated at around US$10,000. Aside from rehabilitation of infrastructure, Burundi 
faces the challenge of revitalising essential public sector services. The country needs to 
recruit more professionals such as doctors, nurses, teachers and others as many of them 
left the country to seek greener pastures in other countries. Although NGOs and aid 
agencies temporarily fill this vacuum, they are constrained by donor funding and 
therefore may have to withdraw from the country on this basis.116  
 
Political reconstruction refers to the measures taken towards the establishment of the rule 
of law and which will foster national reconciliation. The reform of judiciary, 
advancement of women, democratisation of institutions and support for parliament, civil 
society and the media make up core areas for political reconstruction. First, there should 
be promotion of impartial and independent judiciary. In this respect, all petitions and 
appeals relating to assassinations and political trials shall be made through the National 
Truth and Reconciliation. Commission. The judicial machinery has to be reformed at all 
levels with a view to correcting ethnic and gender imbalances. It has to amend the laws 
such as criminal code, code of criminal procedure, civil code, nationality act and others if 
necessary. There should be reform of the judicial service commission so as to ensure its 
independence and that of the judicial system. Judicial training programme should be 
organised through the establishment of a national school for the magistracy. There should 
be provision of adequate human and material resources for the courts as well as the 
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establishment of the post of ombudsdperson. Second, the other concern is the human 
rights. In March 2004 the UN’s special reporter on human rights reported that political 
progress had yet to produce any significant improvements in both the humanitarian 
situation and in respect for human rights. The report states that throughout the period 
under consideration, the same human rights violations observed before were continuing 
in differing degrees of intensity. There are number of abuses of civil and political rights 
of the citizens. The impunity of categories of people such army and rebels ha attributed to 
the numerous cases of abuse. These include the violation of the right to life, physical 
integrity, liberty, freedom of movement, opinion and expression. These kinds of abuses 
are severe for women and children as will be outlined below.117  
 
Third, the promotion of the advancement of women and children is the major obstacle in 
political reconstruction in Burundi. Although, the Arusha accords encapsulate the major 
challenges facing women, and recommend sound steps to redress, such reforms are still 
lacking. According to Arusha, women must be included as peace mediators and on 
management of bodies for transition. In addition, they must compose 30% of 
parliamentary positions. Presently, there are only three female ministers out of total of 27, 
while only 20 senators out of a body of 54 are female. One can take into consideration the 
fact that 79% of labour makes up of women. The most pressing factor is formal 
education. The United Nations Populations Fund reports that over 72% of Burundian 
females over the age of 15 are illiterate. Rape has been used as an instrument of war in 
Burundi. The definition of rape is not specified in the country’s legal code and loosely 
translates as obscene behaviour and it is not viewed as a serious crime. Human rights 
workers maintain that there is almost no chance of prosecuting rapists in the formal court 
system as the traditional Bashingantahe mediation mechanism often recommends 
marriage between victim and perpetrator to avoid social stigma. There is a widespread 
mistreatment of widows, who do not have men to protect them. They resort into 
prostitution in order to survive, then contract HIV and perish leaving behind their 
children who turn to delinquency, begging and banditry to survive. 118   
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5.9 National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (NTRC) 
 
The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established on 05 January 2005 
in Burundi as one of the mechanisms identified for the purposes of national 
reconciliation. This model has been successful in South Africa and Sierra Leone. This did 
not apply in Lesotho since the ethnicity was not an issue, it was just the struggle over 
power among the political parties and the monarchy. South Africa had a major influence 
in particular former president Nelson Mandela to integrate this commission as a way of 
finding reconciliation among the people of Burundi. The commission takes its origins in 
the Arusha Peace Accord.119 It has the following functions: first, it shall bring to light and 
establish the truth on all acts of violence perpetrated in Burundi since independence on 1 
July 1962. This will establish responsibilities and the identity of those responsible. 
Second, the NTRC shall propose to the competent institutions or adopt measures likely to 
promote reconciliation and forgiveness, order indemnification or restoration of disputed 
property or propose any political, social or other measures it deems appropriate. Third, 
the commission shall be responsible for clarifying the entire history of Burundi, going as 
far back as possible in order to inform Burundians about their past. This purpose of this 
clarification exercise shall be to rewrite Burundi’s history so that all Burundians can 
interpret it in the same way. 
 
The commission is expected to work independently through autonomy in managing the 
material and financial resources to be allocated to it. The Commission shall propose when 
necessary the additional reconciliation mechanisms and shall be free to set up sub-
commissions as appropriate. The public authorities shall have the obligation to do their 
utmost to enable the commission to accomplish its mission without hindrance by 
providing it with sufficient material, technical and financial resources. Last, the NTRC 
has to conduct its work over a period of a two-year period. At the end of two years, the 
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appropriate transitional institutions will assess the work that has been done and may 
decide on an extension for one year.120  
 
 
5.10 Elections 
 
One of the peace building initiatives are the organisation of peaceful, free and fair 
elections.  When the transitional government was installed, it was expected to be in 
power for three years. During this period, a Tutsi leader (Pierre Buyoya) was to be a 
president and Hutu a Vice president (Domitien Ndayizeya) for the first 18 months and 
Hutu president and Tusti vice president in the second half. Although this happened, the 
elections, which were scheduled for November 2004, were postponed due to lack of 
readiness by the government. The elections were scheduled for April 2005, but again 
were postponed for further six months, to the dismay of the international community. 
Below is the Burundi’s final electoral calendar before the new government took over.  
 
Table 5.3: Electoral calendar for Burundi’s elections 
 
4 June 2005 Communal elections 
4 July 2005 Parliamentary elections 
29 July 2005 Senate-the upper chamber of parliament 
19 August 2005 Presidential elections 
26 August 2005 Inauguration of President 
 
Source: IRIN news.org: 25 April 2005 
 
Hopes for peace have been eminent recently in Burundi, after successfully holding 
peaceful elections, the 3 June communal, 4 July legislative and 19 August presidential 
elections, with minor reported incidents. An historic event took place on 26 August when 
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Pierre Nkurunzinza, the young leader of former Hutu rebel group Conseil National pour 
la défense de la démocratie-Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) was 
sworn in as a democratically elected president.  These developments in Burundi happen 
after more than a decade civil war that claimed about 300 000 lives. 121
 
5.11 Conditions for lasting peace  
 
South Africa has been playing a pivotal role in resolving the conflict between the warring 
parties in Burundi and it has become a key model for resolving intractable wars after the 
experience of the transition from apartheid to democracy. Nelson Mandela’s stature as a 
peacemaker was forged in the crucible of the negotiation process in South Africa, notable 
between 1990 and 1994, and elaborated by the mission of national reconciliation which 
he pursued during his during his subsequent presidency. Hence it is that in recent years 
outsiders have often looked to Mandela personally, and South Africa more generally, to 
help bridge differences between governments or to make peace between warring 
communities.122 Although the Burundi is in post-conflict stage, a lot still needs to be done 
in terms of creating certain conditions for success in this peace process to ensure that the 
country does not go back to war. 
 
First, exclusion of civil society in particular women from a role in government is a matter 
of concern. Talks have been held between the rebel leaders and political elites, the needs 
and interests of Burundian citizens have been largely ignored. The marginalisation of the 
broader society has resulted into power struggles linked to the personal interests of the 
leaders, while the grievances of the ordinary people have been ignored. The first task of 
the new government should be to ensure that all the marginilised groups are drawn into 
the process of government. The successful democratic elections do not automatically 
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mean an end to the war. If we remember the conflict in Burundi started in 1993 after the 
assassination of democratically elected Hutu president, Melchoir Ndadaye. It is for this 
reason that there is concern about the political agreement made in terms of Arusha 
Accord, giving Hutus and Tutsi representation in government of 60% and 40% 
respectively. There is no representation for the minority group, the Twa, who have been 
marginalised for many decades. It is essential that the new government ensure that all the 
marginalised groups, civil society and various civil organisations are given a role in the 
process of nation- building and rapprochement. The population should be educated 
particularly youth in positive traditional values such as solidarity, social co-operation, 
forgiveness and mutual tolerance. The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
should resume with its mandate after several false starts, to ensure that those who 
committed atrocities against others are brought forward to create peace. It is a matter of 
concern that the NTRC is still in its embryonic stage and has yet to function. Among 
other things, its primary mandate is to adopt measures that are likely to promote 
reconciliation, and forgiveness, order indemnification or restoration of disputed property 
or propose any political, social or other measures it deems appropriate (Jooma 2005: 
1─10). 
 
Second, the new government should ensure that it addresses the issue of land-ownership 
in this small, land-locked country. Many people lost their land during the conflict when 
they became internally and externally displaced. Several protests by destitute citizens 
regarding land have taken place. Given the limited availability of agricultural land in 
Burundi, it will be difficult to accommodate the growing population. The government 
needs therefore to put in place a proper legal framework to ensure that all the citizens 
receive fair treatment. Closely linked to the above is the issue of agriculture. 
 Since farming would continue to be the main source of financial income for the majority 
of Burundians, there would be dire need for agricultural reform in the country in the 
country to find innovative ways of developing viable farming. Excavation and mineral 
research would be also a key to the country’s reconstruction and economic development. 
There would be a need to raise resources in order to make the most already discovered 
mines and to prospect actively for Nickel deposits. Burundi could also exploit its strategic 
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location within the Great Lakes Region. Given its assets of a capital port and airport 
facilities, the country could serve as an ideal trade and transportation link between 
Eastern Congo and North-East Tanzania. At social level, there should be ways and means 
to fight against HIV/AIDS in the country.123
Third, the government should ensure that it enters into talks with the Forces Nationales 
de Liberation (FNL) led by Agotha Rwasa, the sole rebel force still fighting and not part 
of the peace process.  Ignoring this group could jeopardise the progress that Burundi has 
made towards lasting peace. This has been evident because there has been reported 
attacks by NFL already and this might draw other groups who were the loosers in the 
elections to take the arms in order to be included in the government. 
 
Fourth, there should be total reform of the judicial system. It should perform its without 
any influence especially from the government. There should be promotion of compulsory 
education for all that will ensure gender parity through joint financial support from the 
state and communes. There should be restoration of the rights of girls and boys whose 
education has been interrupted as a result of the Burundi conflict or of exclusion by 
effectively reintegrating them into working life. This will ensure that the country will 
produce professionals such as lawyers, judges, educators and doctors in order to replace 
those who left the country due to conflict to work abroad. There should be transparent 
administration committed to the sound management of public affairs. 124   
 
Last, there should be the revival of the economy. In any country that is in war, the 
economy collapses because foreign investors leave the country and the infrastructure was 
destroyed. There should be urgent implementation of an economic recovery programme 
with a view to combating poverty and raising the income of the people and of a 
programme for the reconstruction of destroyed economic infrastructures. There should be 
equal distribution of national resources throughout the country. This usually becomes a 
major factor especially in countries like Burundi where the resources are limited. The 
                                                          
123 Manirakiza, M. 2005  Nation-Building in Burundi. History and its Impacts on the future. In: Conflicts 
Trends 2/2005. Durban: ACCORD.  
 
124 Ibid… 
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people resort to conflict in order to acquire these resources. The government should 
ensure that it introduces sound economic policies that will benefit all the Burundian 
citizens. The legislation and structures such as tax legislation, customs legislation and 
legislation on public markets should be put in place in order to combat financial crime 
and corruption. Government should appoint a commission that will recover state property 
that was plundered by some citizens during the war. There should be introduction of 
incentives for economic development in the context of fairness and harmony. There 
should be development of the private sector by means of incentives with a view to 
creating new jobs and reducing the burden and pressures on then public sector. They 
should also ensure that the high levels of corruption by the government officials that have 
been rife in the past years are curbed. This will attract the foreign investors that will be 
able to come into the country and create more employment opportunities for the 
people.125   
 
5.12 Lessons Learnt 
 
It has been evident that the lessons learnt in Lesotho were not forgotten because of the 
success that South Africa accomplished in Burundi. The way South Africa conducted 
itself showed that lessons and experience in Lesotho have led to success in Burundi. 
However, Pretoria learnt some more lessons in Bujumbura during the mediation efforts. 
The lesson learnt was that it is advantageous to use an eminent person like Mandela to 
lead the mediation efforts as he commands respect to all the parties in conflicts. This also 
legitimise the efforts and gives him more leverage to find a solution to the crisis.  Second, 
it is also important that the mediator should be neutral so that all parties involved can 
respect him. Last, South African troops need to receive more training in terms of how to 
deal with civilians as there were few reported incidents involving the soldiers.  The next 
chapter summarises the whole research report and discusses the main findings of the 
study. 
                                                          
 
125 Ibid… 
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5.12 Conclusion    
 
Despite the ambiguities that surround the involvement of states into the affairs of others, 
there is little doubt that South Africa’s engagement and other key players in the Burundi 
peace process fully enjoy the sanction of international law, having the full backing of the 
AU and the UN. Nevertheless, this does not mean that because an action is internationally 
legitimate, there will be international will to support it. This has been the case in Africa, 
where the international community as a whole appears peculiarly reluctant to get to grips 
with major crises, however disastrous for human rights these might be. This has been 
demonstrated by the ambivalence of the UN towards becoming involved in Burundi’s 
internal affairs.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6. CONCLUSION  
 
6.1 Summary and Findings 
 
South Africa’s transition from brutal apartheid regime to democratically elected 
government has been one of the few success stories in the African continent. It is this 
reason why South Africa still commands respect all over the globe in particular former 
president Nelson ‘Madiba’ Mandela. Madiba, his clan name, has been seen as the 
Messiah of the South African people. He spent 27 years in jail fighting for the liberation 
of South African people who were oppressed and became the first democratic president 
of the Republic of South Africa. Mandela played a vital role in crafting South Africa’s 
foreign policy. Before 1994, there was a lot of discrimination where blacks were strongly 
marginilised. They did not have any representation in the parliament and did not have the 
right to vote. It was this reason that Madiba because of the injustices of the past and 
disrespect of human rights by apartheid regime, human rights will be light that guides 
South Africa’s foreign policy.  
 
This is also reflected in South African Constitution that was adopted in 1996 to become 
the supreme body that guides all the South African citizens. The Constitution states that 
everyone has the right to be equal before the law. Second, the state may not unfairly 
discriminate against anyone on the grounds of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, belief, culture, sexual orientation, 
disability, language and birth.  These rights became part of the Universal Human Rights 
that was adopted back in 1945 of which South Africa was one of only eight countries that 
abstained from voting partly because government was already laying the foundation for 
implementing an apartheid programme which would systematically violate everyone of 
the right recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was through this 
experience that South Africa spread this vision all over the Africa to try and stop the 
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countries that were abusing the rights of their citizens for example Sani Abacha’s regime 
in Nigeria, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and others.   This research report has set out to 
analyse the key aspects, lessons and experience of South Africa’s foreign policy in 
resolving conflicts in Africa, using comparative case studies of Burundi and Lesotho. As 
part of explaining South Africa’s foreign policy, a critical analysis of the legalities 
regarding South Africa’s intervention and mediation in these two countries has been 
discussed extensively. This study also explains how South African foreign policy has 
evolved since early 1990s that has seen the country playing a leading role in resolving 
African conflicts. 
 
Chapter one discusses a brief background of South Africa’s foreign policy. When South 
Africa was readmitted to the international fold, it became the member of regional and 
international organisations such as the OAU, SADC, NAM, UN and many other 
organisations. South Africa also voluntary dismantled its nuclear programme and became 
a member of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By joining these organisations, it was 
trying to regain its status and prestige to the international community. However, this has 
not been smooth sailing. South Africa was criticised for acting as a big brother to regain 
the hegemonic status. Again the involvement of South Africa in number of issues such as 
conflicts was seen by other analysts as part of its foreign policy geared towards changing 
Africa for the better, through institutions such as the African Union (AU) and its organs, 
notably the Peace and Security Council, the Pan African Parliament (PAP).  
 
This study has been guided by the three main research questions: 
 
♦ First, what are the key principles of South African foreign policy since 1994 with 
regard to conflict resolution in Africa? 
♦ Second, what are the legalities regarding South Africa’s intervention and mediation in 
African conflicts? 
♦ Third, what lessons learnt by South Africa in its engagement in African conflicts in 
particular Lesotho and Burundi contributed to shaping its foreign policy? 
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Chapter two analyses South Africa’s foreign policy as being divided into two phases. The 
first phase starts from 1948─1994, when the power was held by the Nationalist Party 
government. This is where South Africa was expelled from the international community. 
South Africa could not do any activities around the world for example they could not 
participate in any international sports and cultural competitions. The UN applied 
sanctions on the regime.  The second phase starts from 1994 till the present. This is when 
South Africa was readmitted to the international community after so many years in 
isolation. South Africa has been playing a number of leading roles in the African 
continent such as mediating in conflicts, hosting prestigious events such as World 
Summit on Sustainable Development and others. South Africa’s foreign policy key 
principles include: 
♦ A belief and preoccupation with human rights which extends beyond the political, 
embracing economic, social and environmental dimension. 
♦ A belief that just and lasting solution to the problems of human kind can only come 
through the promotion of democracy worldwide. 
♦ South Africa’s foreign policy should reflect the interests of Africa. and  
♦ South Africa’s economic development depends on growing regional and international 
economic co-operation. 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy after 1994 has been further sub-divided into two phases. 
The first phase starts from 1994─1999 when Mandela was a Head of the State. The 
second phase started in 1999 till the present, when Thabo Mbeki took over as the second 
democratic president in South Africa. It has been noted that there has been a great of 
continuity in foreign policy from Mandela to Mbeki as South Africa continued to play a 
leading role in a number of global issues and became a voice for the developing 
countries. These two leaders have played a central role in shaping South Africa’s foreign 
policy. Mandela’s term was characterised by non-violation of human rights. When Mbeki 
took over the foreign policy was reconfigured and it shifted from being Eurocentric and 
focussed on issues that are of interest to the African continent. This has resulted to rebirth 
of Mbeki’s African Renaissance, which calls for unity, peace and economic prosperity in 
African continent.  
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Chapter three discusses the controversies surrounding the issue of sovereignty and third 
party interventions. This chapter also looks at the legalities of South Africa’s 
involvement in African conflicts. The findings are that after the establishment of the UN 
in 1945, the principle of sovereignty was eminent prohibiting the intervention of states in 
the internal affairs of others. However, this changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
in 1990 when many countries were transformed to democracies. It has been found that 
most countries were using the notion of sovereignty to block other countries to intervene 
in the matters that involve gross human rights violation. The notion of sovereignty was 
no longer absolute and states could intervene in the event where there is unconstitutional 
change of government. Second, where there are grave circumstances such as war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. Last, when there is no respect for the sanctity of 
human life, the condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts 
of terrorism and subversive activities. 
 
The findings are that that most of South Africa’s interventions in African conflicts were 
legal despite some of the criticisms. First, South Africa intervened in Lesotho with 
Botswana under the auspices of SADC. They were also intervening because they were 
trying to protect the democratic government, which was about to be outsted. In addition, 
South Africa and Botswana intervened to honour the troika agreement made by these two 
countries and Zimbabwe. In Burundi, the Great Lakes leaders, the AU and the UN 
supported South Africa’s involvement, as a result it was widely perceived as legitimate.   
 
Chapter four studies the case of Lesotho and its political crisis. The findings are that as 
from 1966 there have been perennial struggles between the military, the monarch and the 
political parties. These struggles led to military intervention by South Africa in 1998 after 
the opposition parties accused the government of rigging the elections. This led to 
protests accused the government of rigging the elections. This led to protest outside the 
royal house and the coup was eminent. South Africa was strongly criticised after its led 
intervention resulted into looting in Maseru and number of casualties. The blame was put 
into South Africa’s poor intelligence that underestimated the crisis in Lesotho. This led to 
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South Africa sending few troops who were less armed thinking that there would be less 
resistance.  
 
However, Pretoria managed to stop the conflict between the worrying parties. The main 
problem in Lesotho has been its First Past-the Post system that only favours the winning 
party. For example in 1998, the LCD won 61% of votes but secured 79 seats out of 80 
parliamentary seats. The BNP won 25% of votes but secured only one seat in the 
National Assembly while the MFP received about 1% of the votes but not even a single 
seat in the parliament. Through South African efforts Lesotho had revised its electoral 
system so that the loosing parties have representation in the National Assembly. 
 
In chapter five, it has been found that the crisis in Burundi was more severe than in 
Lesotho as it claimed about 300 000 lives. Contrary to Lesotho, the Burundi conflict had 
been between the Tutsi dominated government and Hutu rebels. The issue of ethnicity 
that was later politicised dates back from the former colonises who divided Burundian 
people. This led to Tutsis dominating all the government circles including army, whereas 
Hutus did not form part of government. 
 
South Africa’s mediation efforts in Burundi were different from that of Lesotho in the 
sense that Pretoria was in diplomatic engagements contrary to military intervention. 
Mandela played a leading role as a Chief Mediator on behalf of South African 
government. He managed to bring together the warring parties into the negotiations. His 
efforts led to Arusha Accord signed in 2000. This paved way for transitional government, 
which saw Pierre Buyoya leading the transitional government in the first half and 
Domitien Ndayizeye in the second half. Former President Jacob Zuma replaced Mandela 
as a chief negotiator. He managed to bring parties who were not part of the Arusha 
agreement to sign the accord. South Africa was the first country to send the troops to 
Burundi to protect the political leaders who were from exile to become part of the 
government. South Africa’s efforts led to the peaceful elections that saw Pierre 
Nkurunziza inaugurated as a president on 26 August 2005. 
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In Burundi, South African troops were more prepared and well trained to deal with the 
conflict. That is why there were less reported incidents involving South African troops in 
Bujumbura. The mediation efforts were successful as South Africa managed to stop the 
conflict and Burundi peacefully returned to democracy after more than a decade civil 
war. After the blunder in Maseru, Pretoria was forced to keep its house in order with 
regard to its foreign policy makers. For example at the time of intervention in Lesotho, a 
draft white paper on South Africa’s contribution to international peace mission was in its 
final stages of wide ranging discussion with the government. This paper recommended a 
diplomatic approach with the emphasis on peace making and keeping, rather than peace 
enforcements by military means, but Lesotho was the example of the latter. South Africa 
had to learn to be consistent in their approach to deal with African conflicts. 
Last, it should be noted that South Africa’s involvement in conflict mediation in Lesotho 
was for the first time after 1994. It should be noted that the intervention was likely to 
have some mistakes, as it was the case in Maseru. However, Pretoria should be 
commended for learning from its mistakes and managed to engage itself in Burundi 
successfully. Through these lessons and engagements in African conflicts one hopes that, 
South Africa will continue to lead by example. This will show the world that Africa has 
the ability to solve her own problems without the reliance from other countries outside 
the continent. With that kind of success, the vision of African Renaissance will be 
realised. This will lead to Africa that is peaceful, united and high degree of ‘Ubuntu’ that 
has been always synonymous with the peoples of this continent.   
 
More over, one can argue that South Africa’s mediation efforts in both Lesotho and 
Burundi were successful. Although things did not really go well in Lesotho, but South 
Africa managed to resolve the conflict. Pretoria also managed to assist Maseru in revising 
its electoral system, which has been a major source of conflict. The First-Past the Post 
system that has been used was disadvantageous to the loosing parties in the sense that 
they were not represented in the National Assembly. The revised mixed system, which 
was used in 2002, allowed more opposition parties to be represented in the National 
Assembly. As a result there were no reported incidents after the general elections. It is 
evident that South Africa’s experience and lessons learnt in Lesotho shaped its foreign 
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policy, which led to a notable success in Burundi. Finally, one hopes that this piece of 
work will make a meaningful contribution to the discipline of international relations. 
Moreover, one also hopes that the other aspiring scholars and relevant officials will find 
this study useful for their understanding of the dynamics of South Africa’s foreign policy 
in particular with regards to conflict prevention and better life for all the peoples of 
Africa.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
7.1 Published books 
 
Bardill, J.E. and Cobbe, J.H. 1985   Lesotho       Dilemmas of Dependence in  
            Southern Africa. Pretoria: West View Press. 
 
Barber, J.  2004 Mandela’s World The International Dimension of South Africa’s  
          Political Revolution 1990─99. Oxford: James Currey Ltd. 
 
Baregu, M.and Landsberg, C. (eds) 2003       From Cape to Congo     Southern    
             Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges. London: Lynne Reinner.  
 
Baylis, J. and Smith, S. 2001    The Globalization OF World Politics: an      
           Introduction to international relations. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bently, K.A. and Southall, R. 2005       An African Peace Process Mandela, South Africa  
          and Burundi. Cape Town: HSRC. 
 
Brown, C. 1997            Understanding International Relations. 
             Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
 
Cawthra, G.  2004    A conceptual framework for regional security  
               In: Field Shanon ed Peace in Africa Towards a collaborative security     
                Regime. Johannesburg: Institute for Global Dialogue.  
 
Camilleri, J.A. 1992    The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a shrinking and  
                Fragmenting World. Brookfield: Ashgate Publishing Company.   
 
Chhabra, H.S. 1997 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Principles─Options─Dilemas. New  
              Delhi: Africa Publications. 
 
Corrigan, 1999 MBEKI: HIS TIME HAS COME. An introduction to South Africa’s new  
             President. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations. 
 
 
Couloumbis, A.T and Wolfe, J. 1990 Introduction to International relations:  
                   Power and Justice. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
 
 
Dlamini, K. 2003 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Since 1994.In: South African  
                  Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
 
Dube, K.M. 2003 AISA Electronic Monograph. Overview of South Africa’s Foreign  
         Policy in Africa. Johannesburg: AISA.  
 
 101
Gerrit, O. Address by Director of the University of Johannesburg Centre for European  
          Studies and former Ambassador to Moscow during the Round table discussion at  
           The South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 14 June 2005.   
 
Giralt, N. 2004/05 Central Africa: A Review of the Region. In: South African Yearbook  
        of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
Graham, E. 1999 Foreign Policy. Spence, J.E. In: After Mandela The 1999 South African        
            Elections. Great Britain: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Habib, A. and Selinyane, N. 2004 South Africa’s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision of  
          an African Century. In: Sidiropoulos, E. ed. Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future  
           South Africa’s Foreign Policy: 1994-2004.Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
 
Hamalengu, C. et al.   1988    The International Law of Human Rights in Africa.  
                   Basic Documents and Annotated Bibliography. 
                    London: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Harris, G.ed 2004 Achieving Security in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cost effective           
          alternative to the military. Pretoria: African Security Analysis Programme of  
           Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Harris, J.ed 1995      The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention. 
            London: Centre for Global Governance.  
 
Henwood, R. 1997 South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems.    
                Monograph 13, Pretoria. 
 
 
Holsti, K.J. 2004         Taming the Sovereigns institutional Change. 
                  Canbridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
Hughes, T. 2004               Composers, Conductors and players: Harmony and  
              discord in South African foreign policy making.    
             Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
 
Jonah, J.O.C. 2004       The United Nations In: Adekeye, A, and Rashid, I.(ed)                         
          West Africa’s Security Challenges Building Peace in a Troubled Region.  
          London: Lynne Reinner Publishers  
 
Kabemba, C.  ed 2003   From Military Rule to Multiparty Democracy. Political Reforms  
               and Challenges in Lesotho.  Johannesburg: EISA. 
 
 
 
 
 102
 Kapil, K. 2001  Humanitarian Intervention and the Changing Role of the UN. In:  
           Sidiropoulos, E. A Continent Apart Kosovo, Africa and Humanitarian  
           Intervention. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
 
Kegly, J.R. and Wittkopf, E.R.1995, World Politics Trend and  
          Transformation fifth edition.   New York: St Martin’s Express. 
 
Khadiagala, G.M. 2003   Burundi. In: Boulleen, J. Dealing with Conflicts in Africa:  
                 United Nations and Regional Organisations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Lambrechts, K. ed 1999 Crisis in Lesotho. The Challenge of Managing Conflict in  
                   Southern Africa. FGD African Dialogue series No2. Johannesburg:  
                   Foundation for Global Dialogue. 
 
Landsberg, C. 2004 Southern African governance ten years after apartheid. In: Landsberg  
                 C. and Mackay, S. Eds. Southern Africa Post-Apartheid? The search for  
                 Democratic Governance. Cape Town: IDASA. 
 
Lodge, T. ,Kadima, D. and Pottie, D. 2002 Compendium of Elections in  
           Southern Africa. Johannesburg: EISA.  
 
Le Pere, G. and Van Niewkerk, A.  2002 ‘ Facing the New Millennium: South Africa’s  
Foreign Policy in a Globalising World. In: KG Adar and R. Ajulu 2002 
Globalisation and Emerging Trends in  
           African States Foreign Policy-Making Process. England: Ashgate 
 
 
Maloka, E.ed 2001     A United States of Africa. 
             Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. 
 
Marais, H. 1999 Diplomacy Discarded for Intervention: South Africa Carries 
             a Big Stick. Le Monde Diplomatique. 
 
Matlosa, K.    2000  The Lesotho Conflict: Major Causes and Management in  
              Lesotho: the Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa.  
              Braamfontein: Foundation for Global Dialogue. 
.  
Mathoma, P.T. 1999/200  South Africa and Lesotho-Independence or a tenth Province.  
               In: SA Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
Mda, N. 2003/04 South Africa’s role in Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa: Prospects  
        for Co-operation with the US. In: South African Yearbook of International Affairs.   
         Johannesburg: SAIIA.    
 
Mills, G. 1998/99 South African Foreign Policy in Review. In: South African Yearbook of  
         International Affairs. 
 
 103
Mills, G. 2000 The Wired Model: South Africa, Foreign Policy and Globalisation. Cape  
         Town: Tafelburg, 
 
Naidu, M.V. 2001      State sovereignty, Human Security and Military Intervention In:   
              State Sovereignty in the 21st Century Concept, Relevance and Limits.  
              New Dehli : IDSA. 
 
Nel, P. 2002 Untangling the ‘Gamble on Investment’ Elite Perceptions of Globalisation  
       and South Africa’s Foreign Policy during Mandela Era. In: Glabalisation and  
       Emerging Trends in African States’ Foreign Policy- Making Process. A Comparative  
       Perspective of Southern Africa.  
  
Rule, S. 1998   Elections in Lesotho, May 1998. Pretoria:  
        Electoral Institute of Southern Africa.  
 
Salter, G..M.  2003/03  Burundi, Pain Staking Progress. In: South African Yearbook   
          of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
 
Selebi, J. 1999 South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Setting New Goals and Strategies. SA  
          Journal of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
 
Schoeman, M. 2001/02 Objectives, Structures and Strategies: South Africa’s Foreign  
                 Policy. In: SAYearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA.  
 
Sidiropoulos, E. Makhubela, E. and Schroeder, A.2002/03  Central Africa: The Review    
                     of the Region In: South African Yearbook of International Affairs.  
                    Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
Singer, C.  2004            Reinventing Multilateralism. 
           Urbana: University of Illinois. 
 
Solomon, H. 2002 South African Foreign Policy. ‘Preventive Diplomacy and false  
               Promise’, In: Journal of International Affairs, Volume 9, Number 2,  
              Johannesburg: SAIIA.    
 
Southall, R. and Petlane 1995 eds  Demilitarisation and Democratisation in Lesotho: the  
             1993 General Election and its Aftermath. Pretoria: Africa institute. 
 
Suttner, R. 1997 South African Foreign Policy and the Promotion of Human Rights. In:  
            South African Yearbook of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
The Europa Publications, 2004       The Europa World Year Book Volume I    Part   
                                       One: International Organisations Part two: Afghanistan- 
                                       Jordan. New York: Europa Publishers. 
 
 
 104
The Europa World YearBook, 2004, Volume Part One: International Organizations Part   
                                                TWO: Kazakhstan-Zimbabwe. New York: Europa   
                                                 Publishers. 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty, 2001             The  
                                        Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: ICISS 
 
The South African Consulate General, 2005 Foreign Relations. New York: SACG. 
 
The United Nations, 1998       Basic Facts about United Nations.                                  
                                 New York: United Nations. 
 
Thompson, L.ed 2000   Critical Perspectives on Security and Sovereignty,  
                  Perspectives from the South. Bellville: Centre for Southern African  
 
 Venter, D. 2001 South African Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in African context. In:  
           Khadiagala, M. and Lyons, T. Eds. African Foreign Policies Power and Process.  
           London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 
           Studies School of Government.  
 
Wallesteen, P.  2003  States in Armed Conflicts. 
                   Upssala: Department of Peace and Conflict, Upssala University.  
 
 
 
7.2 Journals and articles 
 
 
African National Congress (ANC) discussion paper, 1994   Developing a Strategic  
           Perspective on South African Foreign Policy. Johannesburg: ANC. 
 
Alusala Nelson, Disarmament and Transition in Burundi: How Soon?  
                       ISS Paper No 97, January 2005. 
An African journal on Conflict Resolution Volume 4, Number 1, 2004, Accord. 
 
Ayebare, A.   2000 Regional Perspectives on Sovereignty and intervention. Round Table 
consultation, Maputo, Discussion Paper. 
 
Bome D.J. 1995    Intervention Without Borders. Humanitarian Intervention in  
         Rwanda 1990-94. Millenium Journal of International Studies. 
 
Conciliation Resources Accord an international initiatives issue 15 2004 
                      The Angolan peace process. 
 
Conflict Trends 31 2004 Accord 
 
 105
Dube, K.M. 2003 AISA Electronic Monograph. Overview of South Africa’s Foreign   
       Policy in Africa. Johannesburg: AISA. Pp. 1-6.  
 
Eisa Occasional Paper, Number 25, October 2004  Promoting Credible Elections and  
                           Democratic Governance in Southern Africa and Beyond. 
Focus Light on Southern African Politics  issue 30, 2nd Quarter 2003. 
 
Gwexe, S.G., Prospects for African Conflict Resolution in the next millennium. South  
           Africa’s View: African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 1,1,2000. 
 
Henwood, R. 1997 South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Problems. Monograph  
                 13, Pretoria. 
 
International Affairs    Volume 81 Number 1 January 2005 Chatam House. 
 
Lamin, A. and Monyae, D. .2004 Mbeki’s Crucial Intervention. In: Africa Week    
          Magazine, 22-28 November 2004. United Kingdom: Africa Week 
 
Manirakiza, M. 2005  Nation-Building in Burundi. History and its Impacts on the future.  
                  In: Conflicts Trends 2/2005. Durban: ACCORD.  
 
Mills, G. 1991 Lesotho: Palace coup ends Lekhanya’s troubled ruler. 31(6).  
       Africa Institute Bulletin. 
 
Neethling, T. 2000 Conditions for successful Entry and Exit: An Assessment of SADC  
               Allied Operations in Lesotho. Pretoria: ISS 
 
Onekalit, C.  2005 Focus on the Great Lakes Region. In: Conflicts Trends  
               2/2005.Durban: ACCORD.  
 
Radebe, Thabo, 2004 Intervention in African Conflicts: Dilemmas Facing South           
             Africa, presented at South African Association of Political Science Biennial  
             Conference, University of Transkei. 
 
Selebi, J. 1999 South Africa’s Foreign Policy: Setting New Goals and Strategies. SA  
          Journal of International Affairs. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
  
Snynder, J. Foreign Policy Magazine no. 145 Nov/Dec 2004 
              Wikipedia, the tree encyclopidia, 1998 South African intervention in  
               Lesotho. 
 
Siyothula, P. 2005 Towards a Sustainable Peace in Côte d’ Ivoire. In: South African  
               Foreign Policy Monitor.  May/June. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 
 
The Machigan Daily,  South African peace efforts look like war’,  24 September 1998. 
 106
 
The Rusi Journal        The Royal United Services Institute     December 2004 
                                    Vol 149 No 6 Security Studies Volume 12 No 4  Summer 2003. 
 
 
The South African National Defence Force, 1999   White Paper on Peace Missions. 
                                                                      Pretoria: Government Printers.      
 
 
7.3 Internet sources 
 
 
 Africa Recovery, Brahimi panel proposals for peacekeeping reform. A United  
                            Nations Publications, [online] Available from:  
                            http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll4no3/securbs.html  
    Accessed 23 March 2005.  
 
African Union,            [online] Available from: http://www.africa-union.org ,   
                      Accessed  20 March 2005. 
 
Africa Policy Journal, Congo (Kinshasa) : Peace talks update. [Online]: Available from    
                                  C; MyDocuments/Congo Peace Talks update.htm. 
                                  Accessed: 07 July 2005  
BBC News, ‘Lesotho coup in the offing’, 16 September 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk  
 
  
Burundi: Thousands disarmed since December, UN official says, IRIN, Online available  
              from: http://www.irnnews.org Accessed: 27 May 2005. 
                           
Burundi: Elections calendar issued, Reuters Alertnet, [Online] Available from:  
               http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk. Accessed: 17 August 2005. 
 
Burundi establishes NTRC, News24.com. [Online] Available from  
             http://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news. Accessed 15 July 2005. 
 
Burundi: Peace Agreements Digital Collection-United States Institute of Peace Library. [Online] Available  
               from http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_pr1.html. Accessed 6/1/05  
 
Dickens, D. and Guy, W.R.eds 2000   Non-intervention and State Sovereignty in        
         the Asia-Pacific. [online]Wellington: Center For Strategic Studies.    
            Available from http: aus-cscap.anu.ed/noninterv.pdf. Accessed 01 April  
              2005. 
Mbeki, T. 1996 I am an African, [Online] Available from:  
            http//www.nathanielturner.com/iamanafrican.htm. Accessed 21 June 2005. 
   
Mills, K. 2000 Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and   
          Intervention. In: The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. [ONLINE]   
 107
          Available from: Http: www.jha.ac/articles/a019.htm, Accessed 23 March 2005. 
 
Neethling, T. 1999 Military Intervention in Lesotho: Perspectives on Operation Boleas  
                and Beyond. The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution. [Online]  
                 Available from www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr. 
 
 
South African Government information., [Online] Available  
                                   from: C: MyDocuments/mediation efforts in the DRC.htm.  
                                   Accessed: 07 July 2005. 
 
South African Government information. Online Available from: C:  
                       MyDocuments/mediation efforts in the DRC..htm.. Accessed: 13 July 2005 
 
Talbot, C. 1998 Mandela sends invasion force to Lesotho. [Online] Available from  
          http://www.wsws.org. Accessed 22 September 2005. 
 
The role of South African National Defence Force in African Peace support Operations.  
                         Online Available from:  
http://www.mil.za/Articles&Papers/Articles/PeaceKeeping.htm. 
Accessed: 24 August 2005    
 
The South African Government In formation, 1998 Aziz Pahad: Lesotho Intervention.  
                                                                        [Online] Available from: http://www.gov.za.  
                                                                        Accessed 4 October 2005.  
 
 
The United Nations      Charter of United Nations [ONLINE] Available from:           
                                http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter, Accessed 26 March 2005. 
 
The United Nations                       Universal Declaration of Human Rights 217A  
                              (III) OF 10 December 1948 [ONLINE] Available from: 
                             http://www.un.org/overview/rights.html, Accessed 18 March   
                              2005.  
 
UN Secretary General Report, The Causes of conflict and the Promotion of a    
                      Durable and Sustainable Development in Africa. www.un.org.  
                      16 April 1998 Briefing: Regional Security   
                      Organisations and the challenge of Regional  
                     Peacekeeping. [Online] Available   
                     From: http://www.una- uk.org/UN&C/regionalsecurity.html,   
                     Accessed 05 April 2005. 
 
Wikipedia, the tree encyclopedia, 1998 South African intervention in Lesotho. [Online]  
                 Available from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/south African intervention in 1998.  
                 Accessed 20 September 2005. 
 108
